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ABSTACT 
 
Two central topics of debate persist in the field of implicit learning (IL):  (1) whether 
learning and the subsequent knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning 
(AGL) tasks are best characterized as conscious or unconscious, (2) whether the acquired 
knowledge is bound more to physical characteristics of the stimuli or is more abstract in 
nature. Participants in this study received extensive training with nonsense letter strings 
(e.g., VJTVXJ).  All strings were seemingly random, but some contained a pattern that 
could be detected. Results indicated that chunks of information made available in the 
letter strings were accessible to passive and active learning mechanisms, which led to the 
development of abstract knowledge that can best be characterized as intuition. The 
experimental design was such as to encourage either conscious or unconscious 
knowledge. Subjective measures and post-tests were used to distinguish the difference. 
All corresponded well, providing evidence of their validity and of their heuristic value for 
establishing evidence of unconscious cognitive processes. 	  	  	  	  	  Keywords:	  	  implicit	  learning,	  tacit	  knowledge,	  subjective	  measures,	  PDP	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INTRODUCTION 
Implicit learning (IL) is a term conceived by Reber (1967) to describe learning 
recognized in his first artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks.  Reber’s original 
description of IL included unconscious and abstract characterizations.  These 
characterizations are the principal focus of the current research.  Both have been the topic 
of numerous ongoing debates.  The AGL transfer task paradigm has proven very useful at 
addressing the role of consciousness and the type of knowledge representations that IL 
creates.  This study employed a variant of the AGL paradigm designed to include 
manipulations that will best address these issues.  Methods that have been advanced in 
direct response to past (and on-going) criticisms were also incorporated into the design.  
Of these criticisms, appropriate control conditions and valid measures of consciousness 
have been points of persistent contention.  This study incorporated the most empirically 
valid control conditions and measures of consciousness suggested to date.  A time-series 
design was used to provide for higher levels of training and skill development, as 
investigators in the field have argued that such experiments are greatly needed (Mathews, 
1997; Dienes, 2008; Johanson, 2009).  
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BACKGROUND 
The definition of IL has met many challenges since the introduction of the 
concept by Reber (1967). Frensch (1998), who addressed this issue at length, defines IL 
as “the non-intentional and automatic acquisition of knowledge about structural relations 
between objects or events” (p.96).  This is an intentionally neutral definition as it does 
not mention consciousness, nor does it address the exact nature of the IL-acquired 
knowledge—the more contentious components of the on-going debate. The consensus 
maintained is that IL operates largely outside of consciousness and is abstract in (some) 
form.  IL is characterized by the following: (a) adaptation to detected environmental 
patterns without the intention to learn from such regularities, (b) the acquisition of 
knowledge of which the individual lacks a definitive sense of awareness, and (c) the lack 
of processing typically ascribed to conscious learning conditions, such as hypothesis-
testing or making inferences (Perruchet and Pacton, 2006). These three characteristics 
taken together can be used to formulate an operational definition of IL that provides for 
quantifiable measures of both unconscious knowledge and learning, as well as for 
representational form. 
Researchers have not reached consensus on an operational definition for the 
cognitive unconscious because definitions vary based on the measures used to establish 
consciousness itself (Destrebecqz and Peigneux, 2005).  However, an operational 
definition for consciousness can be framed by applying assumptions based in theories of 
	  	   3	  
consciousness.  Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories are presupposed when Dienes 
(1997) suggests that two basic criteria must be established to indicate unconscious 
knowledge:  (1) the presence of knowledge, (2) the lack of metaknowledge (i.e., 
knowledge of knowledge). Establishing an operational definition for conscious processes 
also benefits from the degree of consensus that has been established on the conscious 
nature of working memory (WM).  WM is traditionally defined as immediate memory 
with active elements such as perceptual input, rehearsal, and recall (Baddeley, 1998); 
elements theorized to be verbally accessible (e.g., Baars, 2002).  WM has also been 
linked to conscious (explicit) learning processes such as hypothesis testing and drawing 
inferences (Dienes, 2008a).   Another characteristic of consciousness includes the ability 
to control the use of acquired knowledge (Jacoby, 1991).  Based on these characteristics, 
consciousness knowledge can be generally defined as knowledge that an individual is 
aware of, that is verbally accessible, able to be recalled, and can be controlled.  The 
cognitive unconscious, then, can be defined by performance measures that lack the 
characteristics used to define consciousness.  Thus, a working operational definition of 
unconscious knowledge can be stated as follows:  Unconscious (i.e., Tacit) knowledge is 
knowledge that an individual is unaware of, that is inaccessible to verbal report and 
recall, and is outside of an individual’s control.  This definition establishes the need for 
indirect measures.  Three indirect measures are described in later sections that were 
employed in the current research in an effort to assess the unconscious nature and 
representational form of IL and tacit knowledge. 
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The Artificial Grammar Learning Paradigm 
The artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm has been the most widely used 
method to research IL and tacit knowledge.  In these studies, some variety of a finite-state 
artificial (i.e., nonsense) grammar (Figure 1) is used to generate a series of elements (e.g., 
a string of letters of a particular length exemplifying an instantiation of the grammar, 
otherwise referred to as a grammar exemplar) where the order of the elements is 
governed by a complex set of rules described by the grammar (e.g., Reber, 1967).   
 
                      	  
 
Figure 1.  Pictured is the artificial grammar used by Reber (1965, p. 856) to generate test exemplars.  The 
exemplar VXVS is constructed by beginning with V at the left and adding the letters X, V, and S as you 
proceed to the right.  TXSP would be considered a non-grammatical string because it cannot be constructed 
by taking any path through the grammar.  
 
 
AGL studies traditionally involve two stages: a learning stage where participants are 
asked to memorize a subset of exemplars generated by the grammar, and a testing phase 
where participants are informed that sequences were rule-governed (though are not 
informed of the rule).  Following training and immediately before testing, participants are 
informed of the rule-governed structure of the grammatical exemplars.  They are then 
presented with a series of testing exemplars, only half of which obey the rules of the 
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grammar, and are asked to determine which exemplars match the rules (e.g., Reber, 
1967).  Participant performance is usually above chance (typically 60%-70%) in the 
classification task, despite difficulty by the participants to describe how they performed 
the classification task (Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1967).  This above-chance 
performance has been attributed to participants having learned implicitly (i.e., 
unconsciously) the abstract, representational rules that govern the structure of the 
grammar (Reber, 1993).  Debates center on whether abstract knowledge representations 
are acquired or whether knowledge is bound to the perceptual1 features of the stimuli.  To 
phrase it another way, ‘abstract’ refers to a form of representation that is not bound 
directly to stimulus characteristics (e.g., a letter or a particular font) but rather involves 
the acquisition of the ‘deep’ rules of the AG employed to create exemplars.  This 
distinction is tested traditionally by employing AGL transfer tasks, where the identical 
AG is used to create training and testing exemplars with different perceptual domains 
(e.g., a switch in letter set).   The following section provides a description of the three 
core representational models of IL-acquired knowledge. 
Representational Form of the Knowledge Acquired during an AGL Task 
 A number of models have been suggested for the form of cognitive representation 
that is acquired during AGL tasks.  Three core models are offered below that range from 
stimulus-specific to abstract forms of representation.  In this context, abstract is defined 
along its own continuum.  At one end, abstract representations are more closely bound to 
stimulus characteristics.  At the other end, representations are characterized almost 
exclusively by symbolic representations.  As has been consistently recognized over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ‘perceptual’ refers to that part of perception bound to the immediate sensory experience. 
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years (Reber, 1989, 1993; Greenwald, 1992; Frensch, 1998; Pothos, 2007), a 
considerable literature exists in support of each of the models.   
The Exemplar Based View   
Exemplar-based models suggest that when stimuli are encountered a ‘raw’ form 
of each stimulus is encoded, establishing a large memory of stored exemplars, which can 
then be used to determine grammaticality through comparison of novel stimuli to those 
stored in memory (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Manza and Reber, 1997).  According to the 
exemplar view, similarities are detected between trained and tested stimuli and compared 
by ‘analogy’ (i.e., a stored exemplar is found to be analogous to a novel one) rather than 
the learning of abstract, algebra-like2 rules (Brooks and Vokey, 1991).  
In this sense, exemplar based models do have an abstract component, which is the 
ability to compare exemplars through the process of analogy.  However, the process of 
comparing exemplars based on abstract analogies is more closely bound to the stimulus 
characteristics and does not require the creation of symbolic representations of the 
exemplar components (e.g., algebra-like variables). This conceptual distinction regarding 
“abstract” is the topic of much of the representational debate and was addressed in the 
current research. Exemplar-based views represent holistic theory, as whole exemplars are 
encoded (Reber, 1997).  They are contrasted against the chunk theories presented next. 
Fragmentary Account of ‘Chunks’ of Information 
The term chunking refers to the process of breaking complex stimuli (e.g., 
exemplars) into fragments that are more accessible for encoding.  The general challenge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The term ‘algebra-like’ refers to the process of learning through the abstraction of variables that represent 
elemental stimuli, rather than learning being bound solely to stimuli.  This abstract variable-form can then 
be used to establish rules of operation and co-variant relationships, which can be generalized to other 
stimulus structures (e.g., stimuli composed of different letter types, or even non-letter stimuli, such as 
shapes or sounds). 
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to both the abstractionist view and the exemplar view described above is that an account 
for learning and transfer of learning can be based on the detection of two and three 
element groupings that are present in both training and testing exemplars (Manza and 
Reber, 1997).  A variety of models exist that suggest some form of chunking that is 
involved in AGL, each providing different interpretations of the use of chunks (e.g., 
Perruchet and Peacteau, 1990; Servan-Schreiber and Anderson, 1990; see Reber, 1993 for 
review).  
The Competitive Chunking Network (CCN) model described by Servan-Schreiber 
and Anderson (1990) suggests that chunks are arranged in hierarchical fashion from 
small, two and three element groups, to larger chunks that eventually establish a 
memorial representation of longer grammatical exemplars.  The PARSER model 
advanced by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) similarly relies upon chunks, but in their case, 
the chunks are used to create rules for the grammaticality of exemplars.  The rules in 
PARSER are still bound to the stimulus features and thus are contrasted against the 
algebra-like abstraction indicative of Reber rules (cf. Reber, 1989a, 1993).  To clarify, 
Vokey and Brooks (1991) characterize PARSER rules as “relational or abstract analogy 
to prior instances, rather than to implicitly abstracted knowledge” (p. 321).  PARSER 
represents a localist representation in that learning is bound to co-occurring elements 
(i.e., chunks), though other chunking model provide for more distributed representations 
that allow for increasingly more complex forms of representation (Boucher and Dienes, 
2003).  Hybrid models have also been developed where knowledge acquired in an AGL 
study is comprised of both chunks and some abstract features (e.g., detection of 
symmetry across halves of the letter string— PTTT.CXXX) of the stimulus display 
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(Mathews, et al., 1989). Most exemplar or episodic accounts of IL have assumed that the 
knowledge of exemplars or episodes that is acquired during training is explicit or 
conscious (e.g., Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990; Shanks and St. John, 1994).  This 
assumption is rarely put to the test (Berry, 1997). The current research addressed directly 
the role chunks play in the learning found in AGL tasks by controlling chunk position 
during training and classification tasks (described below).  By this method, the extent to 
which chunk-based information is relied upon to make grammaticality judgments can be 
determined, along with the conscious or unconscious nature of this knowledge.    
The Abstractionist View   
Implicitly acquired knowledge has long been considered abstract and independent 
of stimulus form, perceptual domain, and sensory modality (Reber, 1985, 1989, 1993; 
McAndrews and Moscovitch, 1985; Allen and Reber, 1980).  In this particular view, the 
emphasis has been on the structural relationships among stimuli that establish a ‘deep’ 
abstract representational form of knowledge that is not bound directly to specific physical 
characteristics of the stimuli (Reber, 1985).  One of the more appealing aspects of the 
abstractive view is that it endures as a reasonable account for learning observed in 
transfer tasks (Reber, 1993).  
 Chunks and the Abstractionist View.  As has been established above, the process of 
chunking information is well represented in models of IL (at least as explanatory for 
learning in AGL studies).  The process of chunking may also have intuitive appeal in that 
humans often learn through the process of associating elements into novel entities.  
Indeed, Reber (1989a) maintains an important role of detecting simple associations in his 
abstractionist account, where unconscious knowledge is established based on such 
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associations (Reber, 1989a).  Vokey and Brooks (1991) provide a context for the 
theoretical distinctions described above: 
 
Obviously, humans are capable of forming and using 
abstract knowledge. However, one cannot merely assume 
that the unquestioned existence of human abstract ability 
means that performance in [AGL] is based on abstract 
knowledge without forfeiting any possibility of discovering 
the conditions under which abstract knowledge is formed 
(p. 321). 
 
This consideration does not refute the possibility of abstract forms of knowledge; it 
suggests that if learning can be described by other means, then these means should be 
entertained.  As has been observed, all of the preceding views are supported in the 
existing literature and each may be a more or less appropriate description of data 
depending on the experimental technique used to generate behavioral data (Reber, 1997).  
Domain Transfer Studies with Artificial Grammars 
Domain transfer studies involve a switch in domain from training to testing 
conditions (e.g., a switch to a different set of letters at testing than was used during 
training).   If knowledge is applied successfully despite a shift in perceptual domain, it 
can be suggested that it has an abstract representational form (Reber, 1989). The ability to 
classify exemplars at levels well above chance, despite changes in letter set, has been 
consistently recognized in the literature (e.g., Reber & Allen, 1978; Reber & Lewis, 
1977; Manza and Reber, 1998; Mathews et al., 1989; Brooks and Vokey, 1991; 
Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993).   
Three instructional manipulations are commonly used in transfer studies to 
establish learning conditions that either promote or discourage the conscious use of chunk 
information.  Observation instructions ask participants to simply attend to exemplars 
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generated by the AG; these instructions are used to establish incidental learning 
conditions (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990; Reber et al., 1980).  
Incidental learning conditions are theorized to promote IL and tacit knowledge of a more 
abstract nature (Reber, 1989).  Memorization instructions require participants to 
memorize and reproduce exemplars in accordance with some specified performance 
criterion (Reber, 1969; Reber and Lewis, 1977).  Participants are not informed of the 
rules of the grammar; hence, these instructions have also been used to establish incidental 
learning conditions.  However, since this instructional manipulation encourages the use 
of memorization strategies, knowledge may be more conscious and thus more explicit in 
nature (Reber, 1989).  Rule-searching instructions ask that participants actively search for 
the underlying grammatical rules used to construct exemplars (e.g., Mathews et al., 
1989).  Instructions of this kind are meant to encourage intentional learning strategies 
(e.g., making associations and inferences or hypothesis testing) that are consciously 
available and thus able to be described (Reber, 1989). In sum, observational and 
memorization instructions are employed to encourage incidental learning (i.e., implicit 
learning) and unconscious knowledge, whereas rule-search instructions are meant to 
promote intentional learning (i.e., explicit learning) and conscious knowledge (Shanks 
and St. John, 1994).   
An instruction manipulation is proposed for the present study for the purposes of 
creating the most distinct incidental and intentional learning conditions possible.  As has 
been hypothesized, observation-only instructions promote incidental learning better than 
memorization instructions because the latter may encourage intentional learning through 
the application of memorizing strategies (Reber, 1989).  However, simply asking 
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participants to observe exemplars over extended training may lead to a lax in participant 
motivation (i.e., sitting in front of computer monitor for extended periods of time just 
staring at nonsense exemplars might lead to “mind wandering”; Reber, 1989).  In an 
effort to encourage incidental learning (and thus abstraction) and to address possible 
motivation concerns, “familiarize” instructions will be given to participants.  In this way, 
training should be more engaging for the participants, while reducing the chance of a 
memory-strategy confound.  Moreover, recent studies addressing familiarity have shown 
that it is often associated with unconscious knowledge (Scott and Dienes, 2008; 2010).   
The main consideration with these manipulations is to encourage as much abstract and 
unconscious knowledge as possible in the incidental learning conditions, this, in order to 
provide the best contrast to the explicit and conscious knowledge in intentional learning 
conditions.  By this method, measures of consciousness can determine best which 
processes are operating across training and transfer test conditions.   Familiarity 
judgments will be asked of participants during training and are a non-invasive way to 
collect data in incidental learning conditions (Scott and Dienes, 2008).  The task of 
determining if an exemplar is more or less familiar does not alter the task as much as, 
say, asking participants in the memorization condition to make grammaticality judgments 
(Reber, 1989).   In this way, learning and knowledge acquired during training in the 
incidental learning conditions can be tracked over time and compared to intentional 
learning conditions.  This is one of the more appealing methods of the Mathews et al. 
research design, against which this study was patterned.  
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Mathews et al., 1989 Study 
The current study was patterned roughly against the Mathews et al. (1989) AGL 
transfer study (Experiments 1&3).  The Mathews study tested a variety of IL 
characteristics, including the abstract and unconscious nature of IL and tacit knowledge 
that are the focus this research.  Mathews provided two instruction conditions, memory-
based (incidental) and rule-search (intentional) instructions, extended training over a 
four-week period, and employed yoked participants throughout.  Participants in the 
memory-based condition were asked to memorize exemplars during training to prepare 
for a memory test to be given each week.  This was the incidental learning condition and 
it was expected that it would promote IL of the underlying grammatical structure.   
Participants in rule-search conditions were told from the start that the exemplars were 
constructed based on a complex set of rules and to try to determine the nature of the rules.  
This intentional learning condition, it was hypothesized, would promote explicit learning 
based on bi- and trigram chunks.  On each of the 4 weeks, participants were first trained 
with a list of 20 grammatical exemplars and were then given 200 classification trials at 
test. In this way, a measure of learning over time was provided and each testing condition 
served as additional training condition (an intent of the design).  Importantly, Mathews 
extended the incidental learning condition over a 3-week period (a new method at the 
time).  As opposed to being informed that exemplars were rule governed before testing in 
the incidental condition, as is standard, this information was withheld until the final week 
of testing.  All prior weeks of testing asked participants to make “similarity” rather than 
grammaticality judgments.  It was suggested that similarity judgments would not create 
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situations where participants would shift to a rule-searching strategy to make 
grammaticality judgments, effectively frustrating any further incidental learning.  
Training and testing conditions each week shared the following characteristics.  
Participants were asked to study 20 valid strings and were then presented with a five 
alternate-forced-choice (AFC) task consisting of one grammatical exemplar and four 
ungrammatical exemplars with 1, 2, 3, or 4 grammatical violations.  This method was 
employed to detect early learning that may not be detected by providing only two choices 
(i.e., a 2-AFC task).  It was hypothesized that participants would select exemplars with 
fewer violations over training.  This hypothesis held.  
Yoked participants were used in the Mathews study to measure explicit 
knowledge.  In the yoked conditions, participant “instructors” were asked to provide 
instructions about how they were making their classification judgments to another 
‘unseen’ participant.  They were informed that their instructions would be the only thing 
used by their yoked counterparts to make their grammaticality judgments.  Yoked 
conditions were used only under rule-search conditions, as asking participants to describe 
what makes exemplars ‘similar’ in the incidental conditions confounds the implicit 
condition by asking for explicit knowledge.  Memory-based learners were told before the 
final week of testing that exemplars were rule-governed before classifying.  All 
participants in each experimental condition were yoked in the final week. 
 As described, the testing condition extended over a 4-week period in the Mathews 
study, measuring classification performance each week in all conditions.  This method 
provided an opportunity to track learning during training and testing over time, with the 
additional manipulation of having yoked participants paired from week one in the rule-
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search condition.  Taken together, these methods provided an “online” measure of the 
effect of training, rather than to wait until training was completed by taking an “offline” 
measure during testing.  Changes in explicit knowledge were tracked with yoked 
participants, as explicit knowledge accessible to instructors should be available to be 
transferred to their yoked counter parts.  The expected effect of instructional condition 
and the availability of knowledge were both realized in the study (Table 1). 
  
Condition  Week 1       Week 2 Week 3          Transfer Week 4 
Memory-same set 
  Experimental    5.07            1.86     .82          2.22 
  Week 4 Yoked      --           --      --   5.36 
Memory-different set   
  Experimental    6.32         5.18    4.96            3.04 
  Week 4 Yoked      --           --       --   5.32 
Rule-same set 
  Experimental    6.82         3.14    2.14             3.03  
  Week 1-3 Yoked   8.82          6.25    5.21            3.46 
  Week 4 Yoked      --           --        --   5.57 
Rule-different 
  Experimental    7.14         4.46    3.75   2.07 
  Week 1-3 Yoked   8.75         5.64    5.71   3.00 
  Week 4 Yoked      --           --       --   5.18 
Control-same set    8.86         8.86    9.18   9.90 
Control different set   9.14         9.82    9.28   9.90 
Table 1.  The expected value of chance performance is 10 violations.  All groups in the Mathews et al. 
study displayed learning and transfer of learning.  Yoked performance shows that some but not all of the 
knowledge acquired in the intentional learning conditions is available for explicit description.  
                          
The teach-aloud procedure (Mathews et al., 1989) had participants periodically 
stop while working on the primary task (e.g., trying to discriminate valid from invalid 
grammar exemplars) to give verbal instructions for someone else (i.e., yoked participants) 
to perform the task.  The main advantage of the teach-aloud procedure is that the relative 
level of performance of yoked participants versus their experimental partners provides a 
direct measure of the extent to which knowledge of the grammar can be communicated 
verbally to another person—a measure of their explicit knowledge of the grammar. If the 
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verbal reports are obtained frequently enough, a satisfactory empirical account of 
participants’ online awareness of their processing strategies during the task can be 
obtained (Mathews et al., 1989). Yoked participants also provide a no-training condition, 
which has been lacking in earlier studies and has been an issue of contention for some 
researchers in the field (e.g., Redington and Chater, 1996).  Yoke conditions were 
employed that were very much in line with the Mathews study and are described in the 
methods section. 
The current research design varied in a number of ways from the Mathews study.  
The familiarity condition in the current study served the exact same function as the 
Mathews similarity condition.  However, familiarity judgments were required instead of 
similarity judgments because the latter might involve associations, which could 
encourage explicit processing (Reber, 1993; Dienes & Scott, 2010).  A two-alternative 
forced choice (2-AFC) task replaced the 5-AFC used in the Mathews study. It has been 
suggested that forcing participants to compare only two exemplars maximizes the 
opportunity for participants to utilize chunk information (Shanks, Johnston, and Staggs, 
1997).   As the balanced chunk strength (BCS; described in detail below) design used in 
the current study is employed to control directly the chunk information available to 
participants, use of a 2-AFC task (instead of a 5-AFC) should provide for an even more 
sensitive measure of BCS effects.   
The nature of learning and knowledge in the incidental condition was not 
measured over time in the Mathews study.  The subjective measures in the current study 
serve this very function.  Also, the process of collecting online training and testing 
measures is encouraged in recent literature (Haider, Eichler & Lange, 2010) as a way of 
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accounting for methodological criticisms leveled at the validity and reliability of 
measurements of consciousness in AGL transfer studies (Shanks and St. John, 1994).  A 
related issue has been recognized in that there are no assurances that knowledge 
diagnosed during testing is the same knowledge that is used during training (Shanks, et 
al., 1997).  Subjective measures taken across all conditions will address this issue as well, 
as performance measures should be sensitive enough to compare knowledge across 
conditions.  Additionally, there is no way of knowing whether participants in an 
incidental learning condition switch to an explicit rule searching strategy, or that 
participants in intentional learning conditions switch to attempting to discover the 
underlying grammatical regularities (Haider, Eichler, & Lange, 2010).  Online training 
measures provide a solution to this issue by diagnosing knowledge used during training 
over time, which can then be used to aid in determining if qualitative differences in 
learning exist due to experimental manipulations.   The indirect measures described 
below served as the online measures taken during training/testing in the current study.  
Online training measures can also serve as external criteria, which can be compared to 
post-experimental knowledge test. This study employed a variation of the Process 
Dissociation Procedure (PDP) as a post-experimental test of knowledge. If the same 
theoretical construct is being measured (e.g., the cognitive unconscious), then measures 
should relate to one another. 
Balanced Chunk Strength (BCS) Design 
It has been found that in most AGL studies, grammatical testing exemplars that 
are randomly created from the AG have higher chunk strength (CS) than non-
grammatical exemplars (Perruchet, 1994).   In an early address of this issue, Reber and 
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Allen (1978) asked participants to describe their learning experiences and how they 
classified exemplars during testing (a measure of explicit knowledge).  Responses 
indicated a strong bias to use violations of bigram chunks, especially those chunks at the 
beginning and end of exemplars.  It was obvious that participant knowledge was chunk-
based to some extent and that this knowledge was relied upon to determine 
grammaticality during testing.  Thus, CS-bias represents a confound (if it is determined to 
be conscious) when attempting to establish an abstractionist account for performance in 
AGL transfer studies (i.e., the superficial similarity between test and training items could 
account for participants’ abilities to classify grammatical from non-grammatical 
exemplars).  Methods have since been introduced to address this issue directly. 
Perruchet (1994) established evidence for this possible confound to abstractionist 
representational knowledge by analyzing the training and testing exemplars used by 
Brooks and Vokey (1991; Vokey and Brooks, 1992).  This study addressed a related 
confound, that between similarity and grammaticality of grammatical exemplars, i.e., the 
similarity between training and test exemplars may effect classification performance, thus 
confounding an abstractionist account of performance (also addressed with the BCS 
design).  Perruchet performed the following statistical analysis on the Brooks-Vokey 
exemplars:  The frequency of initial and terminal trigrams (and bigrams later in Exp. 4) in 
each testing exemplar was measured across all training exemplars.  These counts were 
then summed and averaged for each testing string.  For example, the test string MXRVM 
begins with the MXR trigram and terminates with the RVM trigram.  As was determined, 
MXR occurred at the beginning of 5 of the total 16 training exemplars.  The terminal 
trigram RVM occurred 2 times in the training exemplars.  The resulting equation (5 + 
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2)/2 provides the CS of the MXRVM testing string, in this case, 3.5.   The mean CS of 
training and test exemplars are then compared across conditions (Table 3). Perruchet 
determined that the Brooks and Vokey results could be accounted for by the repetition of 
trigrams across training and testing exemplars. 
         
Table 3.  Pictured is the Perruchet (1994) analysis of Vokey & Brooks (1992) taken from Shanks et al. 
(1997, p. 237, Table 5).  Mean CS compared across conditions show the available tri- and bigram 
information distinguishing grammatical and ungrammatical test exemplars.  The percentages provided were 
calculated by comparison to the maximum possible overlap where each training exemplar began and ended 
with the same trigram and each testing exemplar shared the same beginning and ending trigram. 
 
To address this confound, Knowlton and Squire (1996) used a BCS design in 
which both grammatical and non-grammatical test exemplars have the same average CS.  
This provides experimenters the opportunity to address effects of rule-based 
representations that are available to participants during their classification task.  The 
addition of indirect measures will provide theoretically relevant insight into whether rule-
based knowledge is conscious or unconscious. Moreover, if participants can classify 
correctly when exemplars are grammatical but lack similarity to trained items (due to the 
balancing of surface features bound to chunks), then an abstractionists account for the 
classification can be advanced.  The current study employed the BCS design provided by 
Knowlton and Squire (1996) to quantify the similarity in surface structure (i.e., bigram 
and trigram structure) between learning and testing exemplars used in the AGL study.  
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The CS metric is computed by first determining all possible bigram and trigram chunks in 
a test exemplar (e.g., the exemplar MTX would have a total of three bigram and trigram 
chunks—MT, TX, MTX). This procedure is very similar to the Perruchet analysis 
described.  The difference is that Perruchet balanced beginning and terminating bi- and 
trigrams (often referred to as salient features), whereas the Knowlton and Squire CS 
metric balances all bi- and trigram chunks including those in the central part of exemplars 
(referred to as non-salient features).  Chunk strength with the CS metric is determined by 
the average number times the chunks from a test exemplar appear over all training 
exemplars.  Through this method it can be established which test exemplars resemble 
training exemplars the most (i.e., test exemplars with ‘high’ chunk strength). Knowlton 
and Squire found eventually that chunk strength and rule-based knowledge contribute to 
determining grammaticality.  This joint contribution or mix of abstract and stimulus-
specific knowledge is in line with interpretations from a number of other researchers 
(e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Manza & Reber, 1997).  It was hypothesized this 
trend would be maintained in the current study, with participants displaying a mix of 
explicit, stimulus-specific knowledge and implicit, unconscious knowledge in both the 
intentional and incidental conditions (i.e., some chunk information will be present in all 
exemplars even with the application of the BCS).  Indirect measures are intended to 
‘tease’ these contributions apart, which is one of the more theoretically interesting 
contributions of this research.   Another benefit of employing the BCS design is that it 
has been used in imaging studies to show activation of distinct regions to abstract and 
fragmentary knowledge (Lieberman et al., 2006).  
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The Role of the Cognitive Unconscious in AGL  
As has been established, AGL paradigms can be used to explore the enduring 
questions of the role of consciousness in IL and cognition, and the extent that IL 
processes involve working memory (i.e., the extent to which IL learning and the acquired 
knowledge involve learning based on fragmentary chunks and whether they are 
consciously accessible).  Some of these questions are echoed in two concerns offered in 
Manza and Reber (1997): (1) “can complex structural knowledge be acquired without 
explicit awareness” or does consciousness invariably intrude, (2) can implicit and explicit 
be “deeply dissociated” or do they represent variations of a single learning process 
(Manza and Reber, 1997, p. 77)?   
The association between IL and unconscious processing has been a central focus 
of much IL research and has been the focus of considerable debate in the field (e.g., 
Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Reber, 1967, 1989; Shanks & St. John, 
1994).  This assumption of unconscious processing was derived from results of early IL 
studies (e.g., Reber, 1967; Reber and Allen, 1978), which found that human behavior 
conformed to the rule-governed structure of the AG.  Since these rules were not available 
to consciousness, the concept of a cognitive unconscious was created to account for rule 
extraction.  The suggestion that IL leads to unconscious knowledge is still held today 
(e.g., Dienes, 2008a).  
Much of the early conceptual debate addressed the extent to which IL either 
involved the acquisition of unconscious implicit knowledge or explicit knowledge that is 
available to consciousness as fragmentary knowledge.  These conceptual issues extended 
the debate to methodological concerns.  Key methodological concerns are whether 
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research paradigms can be developed that convincingly and entirely dissociate 
contributions of implicit and explicit knowledge acquired in IL studies.  That is, can 
distinct qualitative differences be established (Dienes, 2008a)?  However, it has been 
argued convincingly that it is very likely the case that both implicit and explicit processes 
are involved in any learning and testing condition, and attempts to dissociate completely 
are untenable, along with all attempts to establish such ‘process-purity’ (Reber, 1993; 
Reingold and Merikle, 1988; Jacoby, 1991).  This realization led to the application of 
indirect measures that attempt to determine when conscious and unconscious processes 
are used.    
Indirect Measures of the Cognitive Unconscious  
 Indirect measures dissociate conscious and non-conscious influences on 
performance and provide quantitative measures of unconscious influences (Jacoby, 1991; 
Dienes and Berry, 1997).  Without indirect measures, hypotheses suggesting that 
unconscious abstract knowledge is acquired in an AGL task are left unsupported 
(Redington and Chater, 1996). It has also been pointed out that transfer studies (e.g., 
Manza and Reber, 1997; Mathews et al., 1989) often lack indirect measures of 
unconscious influences (Redington and Chater, 1996), and fewer still employ the 
subjective measures to be used in the present research (Dienes, 2008a).  It has been 
suggested that more than one indirect measure should be used in research exploring the 
cognitive unconscious (St. John & Shanks, 1997).  The use of more than one indirect 
measure addresses challenges to utilizing subjective measures, which caution against 
relying on participants to make the final determination of what characterizes 
consciousness (e.g., St. John & Shanks, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993, 1997).  The 
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use of more than one indirect measure is also in line with the suggestion that, due to the 
complexity of the phenomenon of consciousness, more than one form of measurement 
should be employed (Seth, 2008).  If measures used to test for unconscious and conscious 
knowledge produce similar outcomes, one can more confidently assert that unconscious 
knowledge is present.  
 Subjective Threshold Measures.  Subjective measures of consciousness are 
contrasted against the more traditional use of objective measures.  To compare, the 
objective threshold, as defined in cognitive psychology, is the point at which responses to 
stimuli presented during a forced choice task reach chance level performance (Cheesman 
and Merikle, 1984).  The objective threshold has been the primary measure used in the 
past to define the boundary between conscious and unconscious mental processing (e.g., 
Cheesman and Merikle, 1984), and is the favored measure by those most skeptical of 
unconscious states (e.g., Shanks and St. John, 1994; Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993, 1997). 
Subjective thresholds are a measure of an individual’s claimed awareness (Cheesman and 
Merikle, 1984; Dienes, 2008).  An unconscious distinction is made when participants 
report that they are unaware of a stimulus, yet perform at better than chance levels on an 
objective measure (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984).    
  As implicit learning is thought to develop specific unconscious knowledge, a 
qualitative distinction can be established with the use of subjective measures (Dienes, 
2008).  Dienes (2008) offers that appropriate measures of unconscious knowledge need to 
show two things:  that the participant (a) has knowledge but (b) doesn’t know that she has 
it. Building on Cheesman and Merikle’s (1984) application of subjective threshold 
measures used in subliminal research, Dienes and colleagues have applied the measure in 
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a variety of implicit learning paradigms (Dienes, et al., 1995; Dienes and Berry, 1997; 
Dienes and Perner, 1998, Dienes, 2008).  In these studies, perception is said to be below 
the subjective threshold when target detection is above chance, but when participants say 
they cannot detect the target; participants lack metaknowledge of the knowledge they are 
using to perform at above chance levels (Dienes, 2008).  Based on this application, two 
criteria have been established to provide evidence of unconscious processing:  the 
guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion.  Both of these measures were 
employed in the current research.   
 The guessing criterion is met when participant performance is above baseline, 
even though participants claim to be guessing in their responses to target stimuli (e.g., 
Dienes, et al., 1995).  The zero correlation criterion is met when participants’ confidence 
measures of their own knowledge and their performance rates are not positively 
correlated (e.g., performance is statistically above chance and participant confidence is 
low; Dienes, 1995).  Based on the results of the application of these two criteria, Dienes 
(2008) claims that the criteria actually identify qualitatively different types of knowledge.  
The basis for this claim rests on assumptions generated by theories of consciousness and 
the logic proceeding from those assumptions in support of the metaknowledge construct. 
Philosophical and Theoretical Assumptions Underlying Subjective Measures 
There are assumptions that need to be accepted in order to support the validity of 
subjective measures. In the subjective sense, the distinction between conscious and 
unconscious is defined at the level at which an individual has access to knowledge or 
‘knowing that you know’ (Rosenthal, 2005).  This meta-knowledge sense of the 
distinction addresses the phenomenology of individual knowledge (Shanks and St. John, 
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1994), where consciousness represents knowledge that one is aware of and the 
unconscious represents mental phenomena that an individual is ‘unaware of’ (Greenwald, 
1992).  This distinction employs the transitive use (which always takes an object, i.e., 
consciousness of something, e.g., “I know that I see a tree.”) of the term conscious in that 
it refers to “conscious access to and/or conscious processing of a specific piece of 
information,” rather than the intransitive use, which refers to the state of consciousness 
(i.e., wakefulness or vigilance; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011, p. 201).   
A philosophical basis for the use of subjective measures of mental states is 
established in a hierarchical framework of first- and second-order mental states.  First-
order mental states are bound only to interactions with the world (e.g., the initial 
activation of sensory mechanisms sensitive to motion in visual cortex to a moving 
object).  Second-order mental states are mental states about first-order mental states (e.g., 
knowing that one is seeing an object in motion).  The rationale supporting this distinction 
is exemplified further concerning blindsight patients, as provided in Dienes 2008a: 
 
Blindsight patients, who have damage to an area of the 
cortex called V1, can say whether an object is moving up or 
down at above 80% accuracy.  Yet they often claim not to 
be seeing, often just to be purely guessing (Weiskrantz, 
1997).  Our strong intuition is to say the seeing is 
unconscious precisely because the blindsight patient is not 
aware of seeing; they do not have an accurate mental state 
about the mental state of seeing.  That is, it is because they 
lack a second-order state (a mental state about a mental 
state) that it seems right to say their seeing is unconscious 
(p. 253). 
 
This philosophical groundwork provides the basis for interesting theories of 
consciousness, such as Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (GWT), which is a Higher-
Order Thought (HOT) theory that binds metacognition to explicit knowledge (Baars, 
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2002).  This consideration directly affects how we interpret subjective measures of 
mental states during AGL tasks3.  According to Baars (1988), conscious knowledge of 
something makes such knowledge “globally available,” meaning that the knowledge can 
be combined with any other conscious knowledge.  These combinations can be used to 
make inferences and associations and drive explicit hypothesis testing strategies.  Thus, 
intentional learning conditions (i.e., rule-search conditions) should promote the use of 
conscious knowledge.  Alternatively, unconscious knowledge may be applied in a far 
more specific way, such as to the detection of basic patterns (e.g., grammatical structure 
in an AG exemplar).  Specifically, if classification performance in incidental learning 
conditions is statistically better than chance and subjective measures do not recognize 
conscious knowledge, one can posit that the knowledge used to classify successfully is 
not consciously available (i.e., it is unconscious).  In sum, empirical evidence for the 
unconscious cannot be established without implementing a theoretical construct of 
consciousness (Dienes, 2008a). Both the guessing and zero-correlation criteria provide 
some evidence for two qualitatively distinct processes that differ in functional ways 
(Haider, Eichler & Lange, 2010). However, both criteria still rely on subjective reports, 
so it has been suggested that such measures should be combined with other measurement 
methods (Shanks and St. John, 1994).  One additional method has already been 
introduced—yoked conditions—which are used to measure explicit knowledge.  Another 
method is Jacoby’s PDP.  
The Process-Dissociation Procedure (PDP).   
 According to the logic offered by the PDP, conscious and unconscious task 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It should be mentioned (and as Dienes, 2008a points out) that even if one does not accept ‘high-order’ 
theories, determining if and when metaknowledge is available still has theoretical and applied value (Seth 
et al., 2008). 
	  	   26	  
processing are qualitatively different things (Jacoby, 1994).  Conscious knowledge 
provides for goal-oriented behaviors that are able to be controlled voluntarily, whereas 
unconscious knowledge is applied involuntarily (Jacoby, 1994; Destrebecqz and 
Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Fu, and Dienes, 2008).  Estimates of conscious and unconscious 
influences can be made by comparing performance on tasks where either both the 
conscious and unconscious contribute to a task—the inclusion task—or are set in 
opposition to each other—the exclusion task (Cleeremans et al., 1998).  Examples of 
these tasks are as follows.  In an inclusion task participants are asked to generate a 
sequence that most closely resembles the one upon which they were previously trained 
(e.g., Buchner et al., 1998).  During this task they can either rely on recollection, the 
conscious knowledge (C), or they can guess based on unconscious knowledge (UC), such 
as that based on intuition; both conscious and unconscious knowledge are operable and 
work in unison (C+UC; Jacoby, 1991). In an exclusion task, participants are directed to 
produce a sequence that is as different as possible from the training sequence (e.g., 
Buchner et al., 1998).  Such a task sets unconscious and conscious influences in 
opposition to each other because knowledge of the trained sequence is required in order 
to produce novel sequences (Jacoby, 1991).  If participants continue to generate the 
trained sequences during the exclusion task, it is taken as evidence of the influence of U 
(Jacoby, 1991).  A measure of the influence of C can then be determined by computing 
the difference in performance on the two tasks and a measure of U can be determined 
based on how much performance on the exclusion task exceeds this baseline (Jacoby, 
1991).  In other words, participants either try to avoid applying knowledge (as in the 
exclusion task) or try to apply all knowledge (as in the inclusion task); differences 
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recorded between these two conditions indicate conscious knowledge, and use of 
knowledge despite intentions indicates unconscious knowledge (Jacoby, 1991).   
 A variant of the PDP was used in a serial reaction time (SRT) IL task by 
Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001, 2003).  In these studies, stimuli were presented 
sequentially (i.e., one stimulus on each trial) in one of four locations on a computer 
screen.  Participants were then asked to record the location of each stimulus by pressing a 
button corresponding to each of the four locations.  Unknown to the participants, 
sequences were structured based on a rule-governed pattern  (just as rules govern 
grammatical structure in AGL exemplars).  According to SRT logic, learning is 
evidenced if participants press the correct button at faster and faster rates.  In this case, 
faster response rates when sequences followed the pattern compared to when they 
violated it would indicate learning.  This was found to be the case and the conscious 
nature of this learning was then tested with a PDP variant.  Participants were asked to 
generate sequences in an inclusion task by being told to try to replicate as best as possible 
the sequence they had learned during training.  In the exclusion task, they were asked to 
do just the opposite and try not to generate trained sequences.  Participants were unable to 
suppress knowledge in this condition and generated trained sequences at levels above 
chance.  This indicated a lack of control over the applied knowledge, suggesting that the 
knowledge was unconscious according to PDP logic.   
 The current experiment used a modified version of Jacoby’s PDP task that is in line 
with suggestions from investigators in the field of AGL (Shanks and St. John, 1994; 
Wilkinson and Shanks, 2004; Dienes, 2008a).  The recommended procedure is a string 
completion task where exemplars are taken from trained exemplars.  The inclusion 
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portion of the task asks that participants attempt to replicate trained exemplars as best as 
possible.  Participants are advised to use any knowledge that they have gained, whether it 
is knowledge that they know they know or just feel like they know.  In the exclusion task, 
they are asked to do the opposite and complete exemplars so that they are as dissimilar as 
possible from trained exemplars.  Grammatical exemplars created in the exclusion 
condition represent a failure to suppress knowledge gained during training.  This would 
indicate that the knowledge applied is unconscious.   
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EXPERIMENT 
 The following research design was roughly patterned against Mathews et al., 
(1989). Departures from the Mathews study include the following: (1) substituting the 
memory-based instructions with “familiarize” instructions, (2) to apply subjective 
measures during the training and testing conditions, (3) use of the PDP, and (4) a 
balanced chunk strength manipulation.  The grammar to be used is taken from Brooks 
and Vokey, 1991.  Exemplars from that grammar were balanced for chunk strength with 
the Knowlton and Squire chunk metric (1996).  Subjective measures were applied 
according to Dienes (2008a).  A modification to Jacoby’s PDP (1991) was used in 
accordance with Shanks (2005) suggestions.   With few exceptions, the proposed 
analyses were similar to those used in the AGL studies from which each manipulation 
was patterned.  
Participants and Design.   
The basic design of the current study is a 2 (rule-search v. familiarization 
instructions) X 2 (BCS versus no-BCS) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA. Power 
analysis indicated an ideal n = 22 for each of the 12 groups (4 experimental, 4 single 
week yoked, 2 fully yoked, 2 fully yoked controls).  Due to attrition rates, the actual 
numbers varied slightly across groups, with an eventual total of N = 223 participants.  
Experimental participants were trained and then tested on the same day and time each 
week, repeated over a three-week period (except for final-week yoked participants who 
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tested only once).  Fully yoked participants (i.e., three-week yoked) were paired with 
each rule-search participant starting at week one and were only provided their paired 
‘instructor’ descriptions to classify exemplars.  Four single-day yoked groups were paired 
with each experimental group on the final week.  
There is some contention about whether control groups are necessary for each 
experimental condition or whether performance can be compared against the chance 
proportion of .50 (Perruchet, 1994).  The contention is based on two concerns, the first of 
which refers to learning that may be present during testing, which is encouraged in the 
present design (and measured in the yoked conditions).  The second is the possibility of a 
chunk bias in grammatical exemplars, which is addressed by the BCS and is a principal 
manipulation in the present design.  For these reasons, classifications were compared 
against chance performance in the main experimental conditions.  However, control 
groups were used in the three-week yoked conditions.  Two control groups (one for the 
BCS condition and one for the non-BCS condition) were used to compare performance in 
the fully yoked condition (i.e., the rule-search yoked condition). These controls were 
given only the instruction manipulation and were not provided descriptions or feedback.  
Controls attempted to classify the same exemplars used by the rule-search group over the 
3-week duration (i.e., the exemplars classified the first two weeks and then the letter-
switched exemplars the third week), again, without training or feedback.   
Participants were taken from the Psychology 201 participant pool.  The following 
method for participant selection was used to control for attrition rates, which are of 
particular concern in the proposed study due to the time-series design and small number 
of participants in each experimental group.  A brief of the study was posted for 
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Psychology 201 students on the announcement board on the first floor.  The brief 
described the study as simply “A 3-week Study of Consciousness” to avoid cues to the 
learning aspects of the study, which may represent a confound for the incidental learning 
conditions.  It then directed those interested to contact the researcher for more 
information.  Those that did were informed that participation in the 3-week study would 
fulfill the 5-hour research requirement for Psychology 201 (each day of participation 
lasted about 30-45 minutes, depending on the assigned condition). It was hoped that this 
process of first reading about the study and then inquiring further would establish a kind 
of “tacit investment” by the prospective participants that would encourage motivation and 
successful completion of the study.  This, without actually stating that motivation is 
required, which may represent (additional) bias in the random selection of participants 
from the 201-subject pool.  Despite this effort, a number of participants either did not 
show up at their scheduled time or failed to successfully complete all three weeks of 
testing.  This resulted in unequal participant numbers in some conditions, but the 
differences were not enough to adversely affect analyses.  
Materials 
The AG used in the present study is shown in Figure 3.  Training and testing 
exemplars were balanced for chunk strength and were similar to those used in Knowlton 
and Squire (1996).  Actual exemplars are shown in Appendix A.  Twenty-three training 
exemplars and 16 test exemplars between lengths 2-6 were generated from the AG.  
Introducing an error in each of the 16 training exemplars created the non-grammatical 
test strings.  The original 16 testing exemplars were used in the non-BSC condition and 
paired with 16 non-grammatical strings in the 2-AFC testing task. In the BSC condition, 
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the exemplars were constructed such that chunk strength was equal across grammatical 
and non-grammatical strings. Across all conditions, the16 pairs were presented twice in 
random order for a total of 32 testing trials. Additionally, the AG selected to create 
exemplars was, by comparison to other AG options, less complex.  The same training and 
testing exemplars were presented in pseudorandom-order each week (though were 
switched to a different letterset on the final week), which should have made the learning 
task easier across all conditions.  These last two aspects of the experimental design were 
employed in an effort to facilitate as much conscious learning as possible, particularly in 
the rule-search non-BCS condition.  
                       
Figure 3.  Grammar used by Knowlton and Squire (1996, Exp. 1).	  
                
Training and Testing Protocol   
The training protocol was as follows.  Participants were presented with each 
training exemplar for 5 s each. Training each week used the same set of training 
exemplars presented in random order each week.  Participants in the familiarization 
conditions were asked to familiarize themselves with the training exemplars.  Rule-search 
participants were told that the exemplars were rule-governed and that they should attempt 
to determine the nature of these rules.    
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Testing began two minutes after training.  Exemplars were presented in a 2-AFC 
test, which presented one grammatical and one non-grammatical string side-by-side in the 
center of the computer screen for each of 32 testing trials.  Participants were not given 
feedback on their performance, as it has been shown that feedback has little (e.g., 
Mathews et al., 1989) to no effect (e.g., Dienes, 2005).  Feedback may also represent a 
confound for the incidental learning conditions by implying consequences for ‘incorrect’ 
familiarity judgments.   After each trial, participants were asked to provide a confidence 
rating of their judgment (i.e., confidence in their judgment that their selection was either 
grammatical or familiar) by selecting either 50 (completely guessing), 60, 70, 80, 90, or 
100 (complete certainty).  The only difference between groups were the directions, the 
familiarity group was asked to select the exemplar that was most familiar, and the rule-
search group was asked to select the string that seemed to follow the grammatical rules 
most closely.  Confidence ratings represent an online training measure and also provide 
for a comparison of performance over time. 
After every 8 classifications, participants saw two different sets of instructions 
presented on the computer screen.  Participants in the rule-search condition were asked to 
provide instructions for their yoked counterparts, which were written down on a sheet 
provided to the participants (for a total of 4 different instructions).  Participant instructors 
were asked to describe as completely as possible exactly what they were doing to classify 
the strings.   On each subsequent set of directions, they were asked to provide as much 
new information as possible. They were also informed that it was important to reference 
letters and letter sequences as much as possible in their descriptions.  The familiarization 
groups were asked to reflect on the strings that they had found to be familiar for a total 20 
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s (established based on an estimate of the time it took for instructors in the rule-search 
groups to record their descriptions).  
  Yoked participants attempted to classify the exact same testing exemplars as 
their yoked counterparts.  Before classifying the first 8 strings, yoked participants were 
given the instructions provided by instructors for their first 8 classifications only.  Before 
yoked classification on the next 8 trials, they were given instructions generated from only 
trials 9-16 by the instructors, etcetera.  
All participants were informed of the rule-governed structure used to generate the 
exemplars immediately before training began in the third and final week. The letter set 
was changed in the transfer task week from XVJT to BLFM.  Participants in the rule-
search condition were reminded that in the first two weeks their task was to use some 
form of strategy to try to learn the rules of the grammar. Participants in the 
familiarization group were informed for the first time of the complex set of rules used to 
generate the exemplars and were then asked to provide classification descriptions in the 
same fashion as the rule-search groups.  All participants were told that the letters used in 
the first two weeks of the experiment were now switched to an entirely new set of letters, 
but that the exemplars still followed the same set of simple grammatical rules used to 
generate exemplars throughout the study.  Participants were then trained on the new 
exemplars and informed that they would be asked to select the grammatical string in a 2-
AFC task, as before.  Participants were provided as much time as necessary to make 
classifications throughout the study and the next pair was presented after a selection was 
recorded on the computer keyboard. 
All participants were given a PDP string completion task at the end of the final week of 
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testing.  The string completion test for the inclusion and exclusion tasks presented two 
different sets of 16 grammatical exemplars previously used during the transfer condition 
(the letter switch condition).  Each string had either one or two letters removed across all 
positions and replaced by a blank.  16 strings were presented in columns on two sheets of 
paper, one for the inclusion task and one for the exclusion task.  The letters available to 
fill in the blanks were provided on each sheet along with the description of the task.  In 
the inclusion condition, participants were asked to generate grammatical sequences.  In 
the exclusion task, participants were asked to generate non-grammatical sequences.  In 
both conditions, participants were asked to complete the task by attempting to recall all 
knowledge that they have acquired during training and testing, including knowledge that 
they knew that they knew and knowledge that they just felt like they knew.  In the 
inclusion task, the knowledge was used to generate grammatical strings.  In the exclusion 
task, the same knowledge was to be recalled (or sensed) in order to create non-
grammatical strings. 
Predictions and Analyses  
Again, Reber (1989, 1993) has argued that knowledge acquired during an AGL 
task is both unconscious and not bound to specific perceptual features.  However, if 
perceptual features are what is being represented, they should be accessible declaratively, 
representing a conscious form of knowledge.  These perceptual features should be 
flexibly applied to new exemplars leading to improvement over the three weeks of 
training and testing in the non-BCS conditions.  This knowledge should also transfer 
fairly well in the transfer condition if it is not solely bound to the perceptual features of 
the exemplars.  Extended training may also develop unconscious abstract knowledge that 
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facilitates transfer of learning during the third week across all 3-week conditions 
(Johanson, 2009).  As such, subjective measures should detect unconscious knowledge in 
both instructional conditions, though it should be found at higher levels in the incidental 
learning conditions.   Fragmentary knowledge should be present in all conditions in some 
form and especially prevalent in the non-BCS conditions due to the availability of chunk 
information.  Performance should improve on explicit tasks (yoked conditions) in the 
intentional learning conditions.  If the increased training leads to more abstract and 
unconscious representations, transfer performance in the familiarization condition will be 
better than in the rule-search condition. 
Evidence for unconscious knowledge has also been associated with fewer errors 
during classification as compared to an increased number of errors when knowledge is 
conscious (Reber, 1989).  This is because it is assumed that conscious knowledge is far 
more flexible and can be applied to a variety of situations, where unconscious knowledge 
is restricted to a particular simple pattern (Reber, 1989).   This should lead to higher 
performance scores in conditions where unconscious knowledge is being applied (i.e., the 
incidental learning conditions). 
Difference Scores for Zero Correlation and Guessing Criterion 
   
The predictions for both the zero-correlation and guessing criteria are as follows.  
It is hypothesized that knowledge in the familiarity conditions will be more unconscious 
than that found in the rule-search conditions due to the instructional manipulation.  
Knowledge in BCS conditions across conditions should tend to be more unconscious due 
to the lack of chunk strength information available to make classifications.  Alternatively, 
knowledge in no-BCS conditions should be more conscious due to the availability of 
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chunk information. The incidental BCS condition should show the best classification 
performance when compared across conditions.  The knowledge used to make 
classifications in this condition is hypothesized to be unconscious due to the incidental 
learning instructions.  Based on this, the guessing criterion should measure high accuracy 
and guessing, denoting unconscious knowledge based on this criterion.  The incidental 
no-BCS condition should have a similar measure, but may record fewer guesses when 
grammatical strings are selected because of the availability of chunk information.  
Whether this will be entirely accessible in the incidental condition is questionable, but 
some chunk information will likely become conscious to participants.  Intentional no-
BCS learning conditions should show good grammatical exemplar selection and low 
guess selection, again displaying the conscious nature of the knowledge acquired in the 
intentional condition.  The BCS intentional condition should show low performance and 
high guess rates representing a decrease in both conscious and unconscious knowledge 
acquisition. 
Yoked Conditions 
Differences between classification performances, which typically show better 
performance for instructors, should decrease with extended training with ‘abstract 
instructions’ becoming more informative to yoked participants.  All measures of 
consciousness in yoked conditions should display a bias toward conscious knowledge, as 
the only available information will be the instructions provided by the instructors.  
However, it is possible that yoked participants could learn something on their own during 
testing (Redington & Chater, 1996).  The yoked control conditions are employed to 
determine if this was the case. Yoked conditions address the important question of 
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whether abstract knowledge can be verbalized.  Reber (1989) says “no,” Mathews (1997) 
says “yes.”  Subjective measures applied to yoked participants addressed this issue.  A 
negative correlation between instructor and yoked subjective measures may be found due 
to an increase in unconscious knowledge measured in instructors; as unconscious 
knowledge increases, ability to verbalize would decrease (Reber, 1989) and ‘abstract 
verbalizations’ would be less informative. 
It was hypothesized that performance for single-week yoked conditions would be 
poor but statistically above chance.  Yoked participant performance in the non-BCS 
conditions should be better than in the BCS conditions, again due to the availability of 
chunk information that is accessible to instructors.  Single-week yoke participants in the 
incidental and intentional learning conditions should be similar, with a slight bias toward 
better performance in intentional learning conditions (once again, due to chunk 
information). Predictions for subjective measures applied to single-week yoked 
participant are in line with 3-week yoked participants.    
PDP across Conditions 
 A string-completion-task variation of the PDP measured the proportion of 
grammatical strings created for the inclusion and exclusion conditions, which were 
recorded for each experimental condition.  According to PDP-logic, if participants have 
perfect, conscious knowledge of the grammatical strings used during training and testing 
in the transfer condition, then they should always create grammatical strings in the 
inclusion condition and never in the exclusion condition.  The equations applied to 
describe performance in each condition were taken from Jacoby et al. (1993, p. 141).  
The probability of completing a string to create a previously provided exemplar in the 
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inclusion task is the probability of recollection (R) plus the probability of the string 
coming to mind unintentionally (A) when there is a failure of recollection, A (1-R).  This 
represents a situation where all available knowledge is being applied.  The inclusion task 
can be represented formally as: 
 
Inclusion = R + A(1-R). 
 
In the exclusion task, strings are completed to create a previously studied grammatical 
string only when it is unintentional (i.e., there is no conscious knowledge that the string 
was presented during training or testing and participants incorrectly provide a 
grammatical sequence).  The exclusion task can be represented formally as: 
 
Exclusion = A(1-R). 
 
The probability of consciously remembering previous strings is estimated as the 
probability of completing strings to create a grammatical string in the inclusion condition 
minus the probability of creating grammatical strings in the exclusion condition: 
 
R = Inclusion – Exclusion 
 
Once a measure of conscious knowledge is established, the influence of unconscious 
knowledge can be determined with the following equation: 
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A = Exclusion/(1-R) 
 
 Once measures of conscious and unconscious knowledge are established, each 
can serve as the dependent measures in analyses.  Hypotheses were that the PDP should 
diagnose differences in inclusion and exclusion tasks as a function of instruction type and 
BCS.  If unconscious knowledge increases, as we would expect in the incidental 
conditions, then participants should find it more difficult to suppress unconscious 
influences in the exclusion task, leading to an increase in the use of chunks that make 
exemplars grammatical. It was hypothesized that inclusion task performance would be 
good for both instruction groups due to increases in both unconscious and conscious 
knowledge, but lower in BCS conditions due to the lack of available chunk information.  
It was expected that intentional learning would be bound more to the physical 
characteristics of the exemplars, thus more conscious in nature (Dienes, 2008a).  
Importantly, chunk information was also available in the incidental learning conditions.  
With this in mind, it was expected that performance in the inclusion task would be similar 
in the no-BCS conditions; however, in the BCS conditions, participants in the incidental 
learning conditions may show better performance due to having acquired some tacit 
knowledge about the underlying structure of the grammar.  If this was found to be the 
case, performance on the exclusion task should reveal an inability to suppress 
unconscious knowledge leading to the creation of (unintended) grammatical strings.  
Yoked participant performance on the PDP should suggest that knowledge acquired in 
these conditions is primarily conscious.  
	  	   41	  
Analyses across all measures followed the same general format.  Analysis of the 
four main experimental groups employed a 2 (BCS v. no-BCS) X 2 (Familiarize v. Rule-
Search) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA.  To analyze the effects across the rule-search 
groups and their yoked counterparts, I applied a 2 (BCS v. no-BCS) X 2 (Instructor v. 
Yoke) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA.  A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (Familiarity v. 
Rule-Search) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to all group classification 
performance on the third week.    
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RESULTS  
Classification as a function of type of instruction, BCS, and time.  
Classification rates were used as the dependent measure across the instruction, 
BCS, yoked, transfer (i.e., a switch to a different letter set), and time-series conditions 
(Table 2).  Passive abstraction, accessibility of knowledge, and abstractness of knowledge 
are all properties of IL that can be tested by this design (Mathews, et al., 1989).  Passive 
abstraction is evidenced by the instruction manipulation if the knowledge acquired is 
equivalent across passive and intentional conditions. The yoked conditions are used to 
test the accessibility of knowledge—if yoked performance is lower than their yoked 
counterparts, knowledge used by the ‘instructors’ to classify exemplars is not available to 
be described accurately and is thus considered to be tacit.  Abstractness of knowledge is 
tested in the transfer conditions, finding support if performance levels are maintained 
despite a switch in the perceptual features of the exemplars (i.e., a change in letter set) on 
the third week.  
The main experimental manipulation of instruction—rule-search/intentional 
versus familiarity/passive—was used to establish explicit and implicit learning 
conditions, respectively.   The BCS (balanced and non-balanced chunk strength across 
exemplars presented in the 2-AFC task) manipulation was meant to control for 
classification bias bound to perceptual features of grammar (bi- and trigram information).  
It was hypothesized that balancing chunk strength would have a greater affect on the rule-
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search conditions, as it was assumed that chunks would be the most available form of 
information to use while actively attempting to consciously decipher the underlying 
grammatical structure.  We will first look at the effect of the two main experimental 
manipulations of instruction and BCS. 
 
Mean Percent Correct Classifications as a Function of BCS, Instruction,  
And Week of Practice of Experimental and Yoked Participants 
 
Condition   Week 1  Week 2  Transfer Week 3 
Familiarity BCS 
   Experimental   60(11)  58(10)  62(10) 
   3-week Yoked   --  --  -- 
   1-week Yoked       55(10) 
Familiarity no-BCS   
  Experimental   62(9)  66(14)  65(13) 
  3-week Yoked   --  --  -- 
  1-week Yoked       54(10) 
Rule-search BCS 
  Experimental   60(15)  55(12)  57(12) 
  3-week Yoked   51(10)  46(12)  53(11) 
  1-week Yoked   --  --  51(10) 
Rule-search no-BCS 
  Experimental   61(15)  61(7)  59(11) 
  3-week Yoked   50(13)  57(12)  54(10) 
  1-week Yoked   --  --  53(10) 
Control 3-week Yoked BCS 51(11)  50(10)  44(16) 
Control 3-week Yoked no-BCS 50(3)  53(9)  49(15) 
Control 1-week Yoked      50 
Table 2.  Mean percent of correct classifications as a function of BCS, instructional condition, and week of 
practice for experimental, three-week yoked, and single-week yoked groups.  SD is provided 
parenthetically.   
 
Effect of Instruction and BCS  
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors 
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor of classification rates across the main 
experimental conditions revealed a marginally significant main effect of BCS, F(1,69) = 
3.45, p = .068, ηp2 = .049, with classification performance being higher in the non-BCS 
conditions (M = 68%, SD = 13) when compared against the BCS conditions (M = 63%, 
SD = 11).   All other comparison failed to reach significance.   Balancing the chunk 
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strength should have had more of an effect on the rule-search conditions.  However, an 
additional planned comparison suggested that balancing the chunk strength had more of 
an effect on passive learning group classification performance, F(1,67) = 3.03, p = .087, 
ηp2 = .043 (M = 69%, SD = 12 in the non-BCS condition versus M = 62%, SD = 9 in the 
BCS condition), than on the intentional learning groups, F(1,67) = .80, p = .38, ηp2 = .012 
(M = 63%, SE = 11 in the non-BCS condition versus M = 60%, SD = 12 in the BCS 
condition), though the effect was marginal.  It was also hypothesized that the rule-search 
groups would outperform familiarity groups, in general.   Another planned comparison 
revealed that performance for each of the instructional groups was fairly equal over the 
first two weeks; however, the passive instruction groups outperformed the intentional 
instruction groups on the third week, F(1,67) = 3.80, p = .055, ηp2 = .054 (M = 63%, SD = 
12 for the passive groups versus M = 57%, SD = 12 for the intentional groups).    
Taken together, the expected effect of balancing the exemplar chunk strength was 
realized, however, the passive groups were affected more than the intentional learning 
groups.  This suggests that despite not being instructed to focus on detecting the 
grammatical rules, the passive instruction groups were relying on the available bi- and 
trigram information to some extent while developing their superior knowledge of the 
grammar.  The extent to which this knowledge was conscious or unconscious will be 
considered when we look at the data from the subjective measures. 
Passive Abstraction 
 If classification rates are roughly equivalent across the instruction conditions (and 
are above chance), then it can be suggested that a degree of tacit knowledge was acquired 
implicitly in the passive learning conditions.   An independent-samples t-test was 
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conducted to compare the classification rates across the instructional conditions. There 
was no significant difference in the scores for familiarity (M = 68%, SD =12) and rule-
search (M = 64%, SD = 12%) conditions, t(69) = -1.49, p = .14, which was not surprising 
considering that this has been found repeatedly in past experiments (e.g., Reber, 1976, 
see Reber, 1989 for a review).  Familiarity-instruction groups acquired as much (or more) 
knowledge of the grammar as did the rule-search groups. Specifically, in accordance with 
the assumptions of the instruction manipulation, the results suggest that the tacit 
knowledge that was acquired in the passive instruction groups was roughly equivalent to 
the knowledge that was acquired in the rule-search groups, which is assumed to be more 
conscious in nature.  However, the conscious nature of the knowledge acquired by the 
rule-search groups is brought into question when we look at performance from yoked 
participants.   
Accessibility of Knowledge 
 A mixed-model ANOVA with BCS and Yoke as between-group variables and 
week of practice as the within-group variable on the rule-search groups and their yoked 
counterparts (including controls), revealed an interaction between classification scores 
and BCS, F(2,204) = 2.97, p = .05, ηp2 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
performance of the yoked controls was statically higher in the non-BCS condition (M = 
53%, SD = 9) than the BCS condition (M = 50%, SD = 10) during the second week.  
Neither score was statistically different than zero, so the effect was not remarkable.   A 
between subjects effect also indicated a difference in scores between rule-search groups 
and their yoked counterparts and controls, F(2,102) = 11.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .18.  All other 
comparisons were non-significant, though a main effect of BCS was again found to be 
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marginal, F (1,102) = 3.14, p = .08, ηp2 = .03 and in the expected direction (M = 59%, SD 
= 12 for non-BCS and M = 56%, SD = 11 for BCS).   A post hoc Tukey test showed that 
the rule-search groups differed significantly from both their yoked counterparts (p < .001) 
and controls (p = .001); however, yoked group performance did not differ significantly 
from controls.  This provides conclusive evidence that the rule-search groups failed to 
describe accurately to their yoked counterparts the knowledge they were using to make 
their classifications. The conclusion that can be drawn from these particular findings is 
that participants in the rule-search conditions did not have conscious knowledge of the 
information they were using to make their classifications, which suggests that it is 
unconscious to some degree.  
One-sample t-tests were conducted to compare classification performance of the 
controls against a 50% chance rate.  There was no significant difference in control 
classification rates (M = 50%, SD = 8) from chance, t(29) = -.06, p = .95. These results 
suggest performance in BCS and non-BCS conditions under familiarity and rule-search 
instructions can just as accurately be compared against chance performance.  
Specifically, no statistically distinguishable tacit knowledge was acquired by the control 
groups, which if found, would have needed to be considered when accounting for 
learning in the three-week yoked conditions.  
There is, however, an important consideration regarding the accuracy of the 
descriptions provided.  This consideration does not challenge the presence of tacit 
knowledge in the rule-search conditions, but may account for some of the performance of 
their yoked counterparts.  The accuracy of the information provided to yoked participants 
is provided in Table 3.   
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Percent of Correct Information in Description 
 
Condition   Week 1  Week 2       Transfer Week 3 
 
Familiarity BCS        --        --  35    
 
Familiarity no-BCS       --            --  20 
 
Rule-search BCS       30       14  33 
 
Rule-search no-BCS      20       25  33 
      
Table 3.  Average amount of correct information in descriptions provided by instructors to their yoked 
counterparts.  Correct information was coded based on accurate references to either bi- or trigrams, or to 
salient features (i.e., letters at the beginning and end of exemplars).  
 
Correct information was coded based on accurate references to either bi- or trigrams, or 
to salient features (i.e., letters at the beginning and end of exemplars).  This information 
was then divided by the sum of all such information made available in the descriptions.  
As can be seen, instructors across all conditions displayed limited abilities to accurately 
describe relevant information about the grammatical structure.  This suggests that their 
knowledge is more tacit in nature. 
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (Familiarity v. Rule-Search) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS) 
ANOVA was applied to all group classification performance on the third week.  This 
analysis revealed a main effect for instruction, F(1,211) = 4.25, p = .04, ηp2 = .02 and 
yoke, F(3,211) = 8.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .10.  All other main effects and interactions failed 
to reach significance.  The effect of instruction indicated that the passive instruction 
groups classified more exemplars correctly than did the rule-search search groups (M = 
69%, SD = 12 versus M = 55%, SD = 11, respectively).    A post hoc Tukey analysis of 
the yoked conditions showed a significant difference between instructor (M = 61%, SD = 
12) and their one-week yoked counterparts (M = 53%, SD = 10), again indicating that 
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knowledge used by the instructors to classify exemplars is not available to be explicitly 
and accurately described, thus unconscious. 
Abstractness of Tacit Knowledge 
The abstractness of tacit knowledge was tested with a transfer task between the 
second and third weeks. A mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as between-
subjects factors and week of testing as the within-subjects factor of classification rates 
across the main experimental conditions revealed no significant within-group differences 
across performance during the last two weeks, F(1,67) = .310, p = .58, ηp2 = .01 (second 
week, M = 60%, SD = 15 and third week, M = 60%, SD = 17). These results indicate that 
knowledge did transfer to the letter-switch exemplars. Specifically, these results suggest 
that the knowledge used to classify exemplars during the third week is, to some degree, 
abstract. However, there were between-group main effects for BCS, F(1,67) = 5.48, p = 
.02, ηp2 = .076, and instruction, F(1,67) = 5.10, p = .03, ηp2 = .071, which indicated better 
performance in both the non-BCS conditions and in the incidental learning conditions.  
The better performance in the non-BCS conditions has been addressed previously and is 
the expected effect of making bi- and trigram information available to assist 
classifications.  The better performance in the incidental learning conditions may suggest 
the combined effects of both conscious and unconscious learning.  Further evidence for 
this possibility is revealed in the analyses of data from the subjective measures.   
A separate mixed-model analysis with BCS as the between groups factor and 
Time as the within-groups factor on three-week yoke performance did reveal a within-
subjects interaction effect of Session and BCS, F(1,77) = 4.46, p = .04, ηp2 = .06.  
Classification scores in the non-BCS condition decreased from week two (M = 58%, SD 
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= 12) to week three (M = 54%, SD = 11), and the opposite was the case in the BCS 
condition (M =46%, SD = 12 and M = 53%, SE = 11, respectively).  Both conditions 
seem to have transferred knowledge from the second to third week indicating the presents 
of abstract knowledge.  The decreased performance in the non-BCS condition suggests 
that performance was more directly related to the perceptual features of the exemplars 
and thus more conscious in nature.  Specifically, instructors seem to have been able to 
transfer some knowledge about the chunks to their yoked counterparts. The increase in 
performance found in the BCS condition suggests that the knowledge applied in the third 
week was more abstract and tacit in nature.   Performance was, however, not statistically 
different from chance.  It is likely that any knowledge present during the third week in 
the BCS condition was acquired on that week alone. 
The combined results of analyses of the classifications scores suggest that the 
knowledge used to classify exemplars is to some extent abstract and is acquired 
implicitly.  The results also indicate that the knowledge is largely tacit.  These findings 
are in-line with suggestions that knowledge acquired during an AGL is both unconscious 
and not bound entirely to specific perceptual features (Reber, 1989, 1993).  There is some 
indication that perceptual features were being learned and were available for description 
across all conditions, especially in the rule-search non-BCS condition.  However, in 
general, there was little evidence of conscious knowledge indicated by the analysis of 
yoked performance, which was far lower than was reported by Mathews.  It is possible 
that the additional training provided in that study lead to the increase in explicit 
knowledge about the underlying grammar.  Knowledge across all groups transferred to 
week three, which provides additional evidence of the abstract representational form and 
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tacit nature of the knowledge found predominantly across groups.   We will now move to 
the analyses of the subjective measures and PDP post-test to determine if their results 
confirm the general unconscious nature of this knowledge. 
Subjective Measures of Consciousness 
 Subjective measures have been developed to determine if knowledge acquired 
under AGL conditions is either conscious or unconscious or some combination thereof.  
The zero-correlation criterion tests whether subjective confidence ratings relate to 
performance.  If participants classification rates and confidence ratings relate, it is 
assumed that their high confidence is due to being aware of the knowledge they are using 
to make correct classifications.  Conversely, if they do not relate, it is assumed that 
participants are not aware of the knowledge that they are using to make correct 
classifications and is unconscious.  The Chan Difference Score is the difference in 
confidence ratings when correct and incorrect and is one of the dependant measures that 
can be use to quantify this difference.  Within-subjects effects are of particular relevance 
to the zero-correlation criterion, as a single score taken from each participant may not 
detect variations in confidence ratings offered throughout testing (Dienes, 2005).  If 
participants are just as confident when they are correct as when they are incorrect, they 
would receive a score of zero denoting a complete lack of metaknowledge.  The guessing 
criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while guessing (i.e., 
participants record a confidence rating of 50%), which used the total number of guesses 
as the baseline.  Higher scores indicate more unconscious knowledge in accordance with 
this measure.  Results of the subjective measures are provided below (Table 4). 
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Percent Confidence Ratings when Classifying Correctly and Incorrectly, Chan Difference Scores, and 
Guessing across BCS, Instruction, and Week Performance of Experimental and Yoked Participants 
 
                            Chan Difference               Guessing       
Condition                 Wk 1 Wk 2 Wk3        Wk 1   Wk 2      Wk 3 
Familiarity BCS      
   Experimental   2(5)**  3(6)**  2(3)**                  66(17)     69(14)      78(24)        
   3-week Yoked            --    --    --      --       --       -- 
   1-week Yoked     --             --          2(3)*      --       --      68(7) 
Familiarity no-BCS   
   Experimental      2(2)**  3(3)**   2(3) **   61(16)    73(19)      50(22) 
   3-week Yoked            --    --    --             --       --       -- 
   1-week Yoked     --    --  2(2) m      --       --      84(9) 
Rule-search BCS 
   Experimental     2(3)*  1(3)       1(2)*               75(11)     71(11)      50(15) 
   3-week Yoked                                         
   1-week Yoked     --       --         --        --         
Rule-search no-BCS 
   Experimental     3(4)*   2(3)**   4(4)**                  80(17)    70(10)      76(19)           
   3-week Yoked      1(2)*  2(2) m                       79(6)      84(8) 
   1-week Yoked     --    --         --       --          
Cont 3-week Y BCS                                          
Cont 3-week Y no-BCS                                           
Cont 1-week 
Table 4.  The Chan Difference Score is the difference in average confidence between correct and incorrect 
classifications.  A maximum score of 50 denotes complete metaknowledge and 0 denotes complete tacit 
knowledge. The Guessing Criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while 
guessing, which uses the total number of guesses as the baseline.  Scores range from 50 to a maximum of 
100, 50 represents no unconscious knowledge 100 denotes complete unconscious knowledge according to 
this measure.  SD is provided parenthetically. m = marginally significant (p < .08), * =  p < .05, ** = p < .01  
Significance indicates presence of metaknowledge according to the zero-correlation criterion and the 
presence of tacit knowledge according to the guessing criterion.  = no score due to classification 
performance failing to be statistically distinguished from chance. 
 
Chan Difference Scores 
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors 
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor on Chan difference scores of the main 
experimental groups revealed no significant within-subject effects, F(2,134) = .49, p = 
.61.  t-tests were used to compare group performance over the three weeks against zero.   
The familiarity/BCS group scores were significantly different from zero each week, t(17) 
= 3.20, p < .01, t(17) = 4.00, p < .01, and t(17) = 2.90, p = .01, respectively. This was also 
the case for the familiarity/non-BCS group scores each of the three weeks, t(17) = 3.34, p 
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< .01, t(17) = 5.69, p < .01, and t(17) = 3.45, p < .01, respectively.  Rule-search/BCS 
scores during the second week were not significantly different from zero, t(17) = 1.64, p 
= .12, indicating a lack of metaknowledge, but first and third week performance did differ 
significantly from zero, t(17) = 2.57, p = .02 and t(17) = 2.34, p = .03. Group scores for 
the rule-search/non-BCS condition each week also were statically distinguished from 
zero, t(16) = 2.41, p = .03, t(16) = 2.88, p = .01, and t(16) = 3.56, p < .01, respectively.   
The results suggest that metaknowledge was present across all of the main experimental 
groups each week, except for the second week in the rule-search/BCS condition. The 
presence of metaknowledge in main experimental passive learning groups may seem to 
contradict the assumptions of the instruction manipulation—that passive group 
knowledge should be predominantly tacit.  Equally, the presence of metaknowledge in 
the third week may seem to contradict an (implied) assumption of the transfer 
condition—that since knowledge is more abstract in form, it is more unconscious in 
nature.    We will address this in the general discussion. 
Yoked performance in the BCS rule-search conditions did not exceed chance 
level classification performance, so could not be analyzed.  The same was true for the 3-
week control conditions and first week of performance in the non-BCS condition.  A 
mixed-model ANOVA with Instructor (Instructor v. Yoke) as the between-group variable 
and week of practice as the within-group variable on the non-BCS rule-search group and 
their yoked counterparts over the last two weeks revealed no significant within-subjects 
interaction effects for difference scores and instructor condition, F(1,40) = 1.80, p = .19.  
However, there was a between-groups effect of instructor, F(1,40) = 5.39, p = .03, ηp2 = 
.12, which indicated that instructors (M = 2.70, SE = .50) possessed more metaknowledge 
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over these two weeks than yokes (M = 1.19, SE = .41). t-tests on the second and third 
week non-BCS three-week yoke conditions revealed a significant difference from zero 
the second week, t(24) = 2.36, p = .03, and a marginally significant difference on the 
third week, t(24) = 1.93, p = .07.  These were the only three-week yoked groups that 
indicated any metaknowledge. These findings express the expected affect of BCS on the 
rule-search instructors.  When chunk information was available, the instructions offered 
to yoke counterparts improved their classification performance to levels above chance.  
The metaknowledge indicated in these yoked conditions is likely bound to the explicitly 
described chunk information.  The lack of metaknowledge during the first yoked week 
performance may be due to the instructors’ lack of practice in providing descriptions.  It 
could also be due to the unconscious nature of the knowledge acquired by instructors to 
classify exemplars.   
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to passive 
group instructors and their one-week yoked counterparts on third week Chan Difference 
(again, rule-search groups could not be analyzed due to chance classification 
performance).  No significance was indicated between instruction and BCS, F(1,76) = 
.09, p = .76, which suggests that metaknowledge is roughly equivalent across these 
conditions. t-tests were performed only for the passive one-week yoked groups because 
their classification performance exceeded chance—BCS, t(17) = 2.15, p = .05 and non-
BCS, t(21) = 1.86, p = .077.  No knowledge of the grammar (meta or tacit) was indicated 
in the rule-search one-week yoked conditions.  The indication of tacit knowledge in the 
passive groups suggests that instructors in these groups were none-the-less able to share 
some aspects of their knowledge, as well.   This was not the case for the rule-search 
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participants, except in the three-week non-BCS yoked condition.  However, it is possible 
the yoked performance across all yoked conditions was due to the yoked participants’ 
own acquisition of tacit knowledge of the grammar.  Tacit knowledge in the one-week 
yoked passive groups may not be as likely due to the lack of practice; thus, it is more 
likely that their knowledge is more conscious in nature. Specifically, this suggests that 
the passive yoked groups’ metaknowledge is bound to the knowledge they received from 
instructor descriptions.  However, when we consider the accuracy of the descriptions 
provided by the passive groups instructors in the BCS (35% correct) and non-BCS (20% 
correct), this may not seem likely.  This suggests that the metaknowledge present in this 
group was acquired, at least in part, by interacting with the exemplars alone.  
Guessing Criterion  
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors 
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor on guess rates across the main 
experimental conditions revealed no significant within- or between-subjects effects.  The 
average group scores for weeks 1-3 were M = 81, SD = 20; M = 68, SD = 11; and M = 72, 
SD = 21, respectively.  This indicated the presence of tacit knowledge in all of the main 
experimental groups.  As to whether the chance level performance of yoked counterparts 
in the rule-search groups was due, in part, to the tacit nature of instructor knowledge, a 2 
(Instruction) X 2 (BCS) ANOVA was performed.  This analysis revealed a marginal 
effect of instruction, F(1,25) = 3.53, p = .07, ηp2 = .12, indicating more tacit knowledge in 
the rule-search groups (M = 78, SD = 15) than in the passive groups (M = 65, SD = 16).  
It is thus possible that the poor classification performance in the yoked conditions was 
due to the tacit nature of the instructor knowledge.  The average accuracy of the 
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descriptions offered by the rule-search groups also supports this (M = 35%). Analysis of 
second week scores revealed no significant differences, F(3,19) = .08,  p = .97.  Third 
week analysis similarly showed no significant differences across groups, F(3,18) = .84, p 
= .49 (average M = 74, SD = 20).  Tacit knowledge was only marginally indicated in the 
familiarity no-BCS, t(14) = 1.92, p = .08, and failed to be indicated in the rule-search 
BCS condition. The lack of tacit knowledge in these conditions seems to partially 
contradict the assumptions of the BCS manipulation (more metaknowledge in the non-
BCS conditions and more tacit knowledge in the BCS conditions).  The Chan difference 
score for the rule-search BCS group does indicate some metaknowledge, but the poor 
classification performance of their three- and one-week yoked counterparts (M = 53, SD 
= 11 and M = 51, SD = 10, which failed to be distinguished from chance level 
performance) suggests that the amount of metaknowledge is low.  All knowledge for this 
group transferred from weeks two (M = 55, SD = 12) to three (M = 57, SD = 12), so was 
abstract in nature according to the assumptions of the transfer condition.  It may also be 
unconscious by the same assumptions, which should have been represented by a higher 
guessing criterion score.  One reason that the guessing criterion failed to recognize this 
tacit knowledge may be due to the low level of guesses in this condition.  There were 
only two confidence ratings of 50% recorded, one for an incorrect response and one for a 
correct response.  This may be a delimiting factor in the application of this criterion. 
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to passive 
group instructors and their one-week yoked counterparts on the third week guess rates 
(rule-search groups could not be analyzed due to chance classification performance).  No 
significant differences were found between participant condition and BCS, F(1,14) = 
	  	   56	  
3.11, p = .10, ηp2 = .03.  t-tests were performed only for the passive one-week yoked 
groups because their classification performance exceeded chance—BCS, t(17) = 2.15, p 
= .05 and non-BCS, t(21) = 1.86, p = .08.  Tacit knowledge was thus indicated in both 
passive yoked conditions. 
 A summary of the results of the subjective measures reveal a few interesting 
trends, each of which only partially coincides with original predictions.  It was predicted 
that knowledge would be more tacit in nature in the passive instruction groups and more 
conscious in nature in the intentional instruction groups.  However, metaknowledge was 
indicated across all conditions and across all weeks of testing, which when considered in 
light of performance in the yoked conditions, draws into question the explicit nature of 
metaknowledge.  Tacit knowledge was also indicated across all groups and was 
especially prevalent in the rule-search non-BCS condition, where it was least expected to 
be found.  It was also predicted that knowledge in the BCS conditions would be more 
tacit in nature and that metaknowledge would be more prevalent in the non-BCS 
conditions.  Again, this seems to be only partially confirmed by the performance in the 
passive no-BCS condition.  It was predicted that familiarity groups would have the best 
overall classification performance, yet, the best performance was predicted to be in the 
familiarity-BCS group, but was eventually indicated in the familiarity no-BCS condition.  
The suggestion across all findings is that the metaknowledge may be characterized by 
something other than an explicit understanding of the perceptual features and 
grammatical structure.  
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Process Dissociation Procedure 
 According to PDP-logic, if participants possess perfect metaknowledge of the 
grammatical structure they will create grammatical strings in the inclusion task and never 
in the exclusion task.  It was predicted that conscious knowledge would be indicated by 
the inclusion task across all groups due to increases in both conscious and unconscious 
knowledge of the grammar, but lower in the BCS conditions.  It was also predicted that 
tacit knowledge would be more prevalent in the familiarity and BCS conditions, which 
should lead to higher scores in the exclusion task.  Results for the PDP are provided in 
Table 5. 
Process Dissociation Procedure measures of  
Conscious (Inclusion Task) and Unconscious (Exclusion Task) Influences  
As a Function of BCS, Instruction, and Yoked Conditions 
 
Condition                 Inclusion                           Exclusion                         
Familiarity BCS 
   Experimental   .02(.21)   .27(.16)     
   3-week Yoked   --   --   
   1-week Yoked   .24(.26)   .16(.13) 
Familiarity no-BCS   
  Experimental   .04(.13)   .29(.09)  
  3-week Yoked   --   --    
  1-week Yoked   .16(.21)   .18(.11) 
Rule-search BCS 
  Experimental   .09(.14)   .38(.17) 
  3-week Yoked   .01(.17)   .38(.08) 
  1-week Yoked   .08(.20)   .21(.08) 
Rule-search no-BCS 
  Experimental   .21(.28)   .27(.18) 
  3-week Yoked   .17(.14)   .26(.14) 
  1-week Yoked   .03(.14)   .21(.13) 
Cont 3-week Y BCS  .00(.12)   .19(.14) 
Cont 3-week Y no-BCS             .00(.08)   .21(.18) 
Cont 1-week Yoked       0        0  
Table 5.  The Process Dissociation Procedure provides a measure of conscious (C) and unconscious (UC) 
knowledge of letter sequences that create grammatical strings. Standard errors are provided parenthetically	  
 
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Instruction (Rule-Search 
v. Familiarity) as the between-subjects factors and Test (inclusion and exclusion) as the 
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within-subjects factors across the main experimental conditions revealed a main effect for 
type of test, [F(1,67) = 38.29, p < .01, ηp2 = .36] and instruction [F(1,67) = 9.34, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .12].  BCS failed to reach significance.  As shown by a planned comparison on 
performance in the inclusion task, F(1,69) = 6.06, p = .02, the rule-search groups 
possessed more conscious knowledge when compared to the familiarity groups.  In-fact, 
familiarity group performance did not vary significantly from baseline (0 grammatical 
strings created), t(35) = 1.07, p = .29, suggesting the almost complete lack of conscious 
knowledge in accordance with this measure.  A planned comparison on performance on 
the exclusion task indicated that tacit knowledge was statically equal across both 
instruction conditions, F(1,69) = 1.43, p = .24.  Both groups recorded levels of tacit 
knowledge that were well above baseline [t(35) = 10.35, p < .01 and t(35) = 12.22, p < 
.01, for rule-search and familiarity groups, respectively].  These results appear to indicate 
that the acquisition of conscious knowledge was restricted to the rule-search conditions 
and that both conditions acquired some tacit knowledge of the grammar.  
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v. 
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Test (inclusion and exclusion) as the within-
subjects factors across the rule-search groups and their three-week yoked counterparts 
(excluding controls) revealed an interaction between Test and BCS, F(1,75) = 17.35, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .18. Pairwise comparisons indicated that there was a statically significant (p < 
.01) difference in test scores for the BCS conditions (inclusion M = .05, SE = .04, 
exclusion M = .38, SE =.04), but only marginal significance (p = .08) in the non-BCS 
conditions (inclusion M = .19, SE = .03, exclusion M = .26, SE =.02).  The decrease in 
metaknowledge in the BCS condition is, once again, the expected effect of reducing the 
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availability of chunk information. These results also indicate the prevalence of tacit 
knowledge across groups, which is in line with the results from the subjective measures.    
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v. 
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and Test 
(inclusion and exclusion) as the within-subjects factors across the main experimental 
groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed two three-way interactions.  
There was an interaction between Instruction, Instructor, and Test type, F(1,142) = 7.49, 
p = .01, ηp2 = .05, and one between-subjects interaction between BCS, Instructor, and 
Test type, F(1,142) = 3.74, p = .06, ηp2 = .03.  These three-way interactions were 
supported only by one two-way interaction between Instructor and Test type.  For this 
reason, I split the data along the Instructor condition and did separate analyses, one on the 
four instructor conditions and one on their one-week yoked counterparts.  The 2 (Rule-
search v. Familiarity) X 2 (BCS v. non-BCS) X 2 (Inclusion v. Exclusion) mixed-model 
analysis across the main experimental groups was performed previously.  The results of 
this analysis are at the beginning of this section.  Those results did not indicate any 
interactions, so it was expected that the same analysis on the one-week yoked groups 
would reveal an interaction.  This was in fact the case with an interaction being found 
between Instructions and Test type, F(1,75) = 7.73, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that there was a statistically significant (p < .01) difference in test 
scores for the rule-search conditions (inclusion M = .05, SE = .03, exclusion M = .21, SE 
=.01), but no such difference found in the familiarity groups (p = .59; inclusion M = .20, 
SE = .03, exclusion M = .17, SE =.02).  These results suggest that familiarity groups had 
more total knowledge (metaknowledge and tacit knowledge) when classifying exemplars.  
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This should be evidenced by better classification rates when compared against the rule-
search groups.  However, analysis of one-week yoke classification performance collapsed 
across BCS conditions failed to support this, F(1,78) = .91, p = .34, though scores did 
seem to suggest this expected effect (rule-search M = 56%, SD = 12; familiarity M = 
58%, SD =.12).    
Subjective Measures on the Process Dissociation Procedure 
 Confidence ratings were recorded for each response on both tests of the PDP.  To 
my knowledge, subjective measures have not been used in such an application.  It was 
predicted that there should be a relationship between the scores used to indicate 
metaknowledge (the zero-correlation criterion and inclusion task), as well as a 
relationship between those used to indicate tacit knowledge (the guessing criterion and 
exclusion task).  Table 6 provides the PDP data once again, along with scores from the 
subjective measures as applied to each of the PDP tests. 
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PDP Measures of Conscious (Inclusion Task) and Unconscious Influences (Exclusion Task),  
Chan Difference Scores on PDP, and Guessing Criterion on PDP  
As a Function of BCS, Instruction, and Yoked Conditions 
 
Condition                   Inclusion    Exclusion                          Chan                              Guess 
              Inclusion         Exclusion           Inclusion        Exclusion 
Familiarity BCS 
  Experimental        .02(.21)      .27(.16)              5(7)         3(7)                    53(7)             62(18) 
  3-week Yoked             --                --  --           --          --       -- 
  1-week Yoked        .24(.26)      .16(.13)              8(7)         3(5)               57(8)             56(7) 
Familiarity no-BCS   
  Experimental        .04(.13)      .29(.09)                  5(5)         2(4)       52(2)             59(11) 
  3-week Yoked             --   --   --           --          --          -- 
  1-week Yoked        .16(.21)      .18(.11)                  3(5)         0(1)       61(11)           64(24) 
Rule-search BCS 
  Experimental        .09(.14)      .38(.17)                  7(8)         3(5)       52(4)             59(20) 
  3-week Yoked        .01(.17)      .38(.08)               1(1)         0(1)       82(25)           58(10) 
  1-week Yoked        .08(.20)      .21(.08)              6(9)         3(5)       55(6)             57(7) 
Rule-search no-BCS 
  Experimental        .21(.28)      .27(.18)              7(7)         1(1)       50(0)             51(2) 
  3-week Yoked        .17(.14)      .26(.14)              5(8)         5(8)       54(4)             50(0) 
  1-week Yoked        .03(.14)      .21(.13)              9(12)         4(6)       53(4)             57(6) 
Cont 3-wk YBCS        .00(.12)      .19(.14)                                        
Cont 3-wk Yno-BCS  .00(.08)      .21(.18)                                               
Cont 1-wk Yoked             0                0    0           0             0                  0 
Table 6.  The Process Dissociation Procedure provides a measure of conscious (inclusion task) and 
unconscious (exclusion task) knowledge of letter sequences that create grammatical strings. The Chan 
Difference Score is the difference in average confidence between correct and incorrect classifications.  A 
maximum score of 50 denotes complete metaknowledge and 0 denotes complete tacit knowledge. The 
Guessing Criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while guessing, which uses 
the total number of guesses as the baseline.  Scores range from 50 to a maximum of 100, 50 represents no 
unconscious knowledge 100 denotes complete unconscious knowledge according to this measure. Standard 
deviations are provided parenthetically.  = scores unable to be determined due to chance level 
performance. 
 
Chan Difference Scores on PDP Inclusion and Exclusion Tests 
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and Instruction as the between-subjects factors 
and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and 
exclusion tasks across the main experimental conditions revealed an interaction between 
Chan difference scores and Instructions, F(1,67) = 4.75, p = .03, ηp2 = .07.  Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were significantly different in the rule-
search conditions (p < .01), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 6.9, SE = 
1.12) as compared against scores in the exclusion task (M = 1.9, SE = .81).  This same 
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trend was only marginally significant in the familiarity conditions (p = .08), with scores 
slightly higher in the inclusion task (M =4.83, SE = 1.10) as compared to scores in the 
exclusion task (M = 3.01, SE = .79).  
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v. 
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects 
factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across the rule-search groups and their 
three-week yoked counterparts (excluding controls because their scores failed to be 
statistically distinguished from baseline in the inclusion condition) revealed a interaction 
between Chan difference scores and Yoke, F(1,75) = 15.55, p < .01, ηp2 = .17. Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were significantly different in the 
instructor conditions (p < .01), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 6.9, 
SE = 1.12) as compared against scores in the exclusion task (M = 1.9, SE = .81).  There 
was no significant difference found in the scores of their yoked counterparts (p = .47), 
scores for both, the inclusion task (M =3.06, SE = 1.00) and exclusion task (M = 2.51, SE 
= .65) indicated the presence of metaknowledge. Chan difference scores on the three-
week yoked PDP test conditions seem to be overestimating the presence of 
metaknowledge.  This overestimation was far more pronounced in the non-BCS 
conditions, where we would expect to find more metaknowledge. 
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v. 
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and Chan 
difference scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks 
across the main experimental groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed no 
significant within-subjects effects.  There was a three-way interaction between 
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Instructions, BCS, and Yokes, F(1,142) = 4.92, p = .03, ηp2 = .03.  Data were split along 
the Instructor conditions to explore this interaction. The 2 (Rule-search v. Familiarity) X 
2 (BCS v. non-BCS) X 2 (Inclusion v. Exclusion) mixed-model analysis across the main 
experimental groups is located at the beginning of this section.  The same analysis on the 
one-week yoked groups revealed an interaction between Instruction and BCS, F(1,75) = 
7.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were 
significantly different in the familiarity conditions (p = .02), with scores being lower for 
the non-BCS conditions (M = 1.76, SE = 1.05) as compared against scores in the BCS 
conditions (M = 5.66, SE = 1.16).  There was no significant difference found in the rule-
search conditions (p = .18), scores for both, the non-BCS conditions (M =6.81, SE = 
1.10) and BCS conditions (M = 4.70, SE = 1.13) indicated the presence of 
metaknowledge.  One again, the general trend in the data is to over-estimate the presence 
of metaknowledge across conditions. 
Guessing Criterion on PDP Inclusion and Exclusion Tests 
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS and Instruction as the between-subjects factors 
and Guess as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across 
the main experimental conditions revealed no significant within- or between-subjects 
effects, [F(1,26) = .06, p = .82 and F(1,26) = .19, p = .67, respectively].  High levels of 
tacit knowledge were indicated across all groups.  The trend to overestimate tacit 
knowledge seems to also be the case with the Guessing criterion across the PDP task 
conditions. 
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v. 
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects 
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factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across the rule-search groups and their 
three-week yoked counterparts (excluding controls) revealed an interaction between 
Guessing scores and Yokes, F(1,27) = 4.33, p = .05, ηp2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that Guessing scores were significantly different in the yoked conditions (p = 
.03), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 68.3, SE = .04) as compared 
against scores in the exclusion task (M = 53.9, SE = .03).  There was no significant 
difference found in the scores for instructors (p = .54), scores for both, the inclusion task 
(M =51.1, SE = .04) and exclusion task (M = 51.1, SE = .03) indicated the presence of 
tacit knowledge.  The significant difference in the yoked conditions was due to the 
uncharacteristically high guessing score in the three-week yoke non-BCS condition.  
Review of the data revealed that when guess rates were very low (rates < 2) participants 
were guessing correctly most of the time.  This does indicate the presence of tacit 
knowledge, but the very low guess rates may represent a delimiting factor in this 
application. 
 Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v. 
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and 
Guessing scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks 
across the main experimental groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed a 
single main effect of instruction, F(1,50) = 4.44, p = .04, ηp2 = .08.  Scores in the 
familiarity conditions (M = 57.9, SE = .01) were higher than those in the rule-search 
conditions (M = 54.1, SE = .01).  The general tendency to overestimate tactic knowledge 
across all groups and conditions persisted.   
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 In summary of this section, it was hoped that applying subjective measure to the 
PDP test would indicate a relationship between measures that shared common diagnostic 
capabilities.  This does not seem to be the case, as both the zero-correlation and guessing 
criterion consistently overestimated their target knowledge.  It is possible that the number 
of letter strings on each task (N =16) is too low to allow for more accurate measures of 
the type knowledge that is being applied across testing conditions.  Low performance 
rates on the PDP string-completion tests may also affect the accuracy.  In short, 
subjective measures used in such an application fail to provide any information about the 
characteristics of the knowledge applied in PDP string-completion tasks. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
The purpose of this study was to examine characteristics of learning and 
knowledge involved in AGL tasks and the heuristic value of measures used to 
substantiate the cognitive unconscious.   Results indicated convincing support for the 
implicit acquisition of tacit knowledge that is at least partially abstract in representational 
form.  Metaknowledge was also indicated, suggesting that both forms of knowledge 
operate in a synergistic fashion under certain conditions.  There is some evidence for two 
distinct learning processes, though implicit learning processes were most strongly 
indicated.  The experimental manipulations, subjective measures, and PDP posttest used 
to provide evidence for the distinctness of implicit learning and the predominance of tacit 
knowledge are discussed below.  
Passive Abstraction   
The effect of manipulating test instructions offers strong evidence for the passive 
acquisition of knowledge of grammatical structure.  The familiarity groups acquired as 
much or more knowledge of the grammar when compared to rule-search groups.  
Performance in the rule-search groups, particularly in the light of the generally poor 
performance of their three-week yoked counterparts, also indicated the passive 
acquisition of knowledge.  The BCS manipulation provided further evidence for implicit 
learning.  The removal of chunk based information failed to discourage the acquisition of 
knowledge.  This was not only the case in the passive learning group, where we would 
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expect less of an effect, but also in the intentional learning group. When we look at the 
combined effects of these two manipulations across groups, we find that performance is 
roughly equivalent between conditions designed to discourage as much explicit learning a 
possible (the familiarity BCS condition) and those designed to encourage explicit 
learning (the rule-search non-BCS condition).   The generally poor performance of the 
yoked participants in the rule-search non-BCS condition provides perhaps the strongest 
support for the passive acquisition of knowledge.  Under such conditions, instructors 
should have been able to describe more of the knowledge they were using to classify 
exemplars, if it was bound to the chunks of information made available.  Performance 
across both non-BCS conditions was generally better than that found in the BCS 
conditions, so we must assume that the availability of chunks of information was driving 
these performance improvements.  This suggests that learning was bound to the 
perceptual features of the exemplars but largely inaccessible to consciousness.  This 
consideration brings into question one of the other purposes of this research, which is to 
characterize the representational form of acquired knowledge. 
Representational Form of Knowledge 
 IL debates have centered on whether knowledge is bound only to the perceptual 
features of exemplars or is more abstract in nature.   Traditionally, representational forms 
that are bound to perceptual features are considered to be more accessible to conscious 
knowledge (Shanks and St. John, 1994).  However, the results of this study indicate that 
even though chunk based information was relied upon to some extent, it was largely 
inaccessible for description.  This suggests that at least some of what was learned was 
abstract in nature.  The performance in the transfer task on the third week, also confirms 
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the abstract character of the representational form.  This joint contribution of stimulus-
specific and abstract knowledge is in line with interpretations from a number of other 
studies (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Manze & Reber, 1997; Mathews et. al, 
1989).  The results of this study seem to coincide with an abstractionist account of the 
representational form of knowledge acquired during an AGL task, which do acknowledge 
the importance of detecting patterns and simple associations upon which more abstract 
forms of knowledge are based (Reber, 1989a).  Hybrid models that have been advanced 
which include both chunks and some abstract features (e.g., Mathew, et al., 1989), also 
characterize the knowledge that was acquired and applied by participants in this study.  
However, abstractionist accounts are typically associated with tacit knowledge (Reber, 
1993), which presents an issue when attempting to account for the metaknowledge 
indicated across most all experimental conditions.    
Measures of Conscious and Unconscious Knowledge 
The philosophical basis for the use of subjective measures of mental states is 
established in a hierarchical framework of first- and second-order mental states.  First-
order states are bound to the initial activation of sensory mechanisms and second-order 
states are mental states about first-order states.   Much of the knowledge indicated in the 
present study was tacit in nature, however, some metaknowledge was also indicated by 
the zero-correlation criterion and the PDP inclusion task.  The poor performance of the 
yoked participants across all conditions seems to question the validity of such measures.  
However, an account for metaknowledge that is not explicit in nature has been provided 
by distinguishing a difference between structural knowledge and judgment knowledge (cf 
Dienes & Berry, 1997; Dienes & Perner, 1999).   
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Conceptually, the distinction is premised upon the difference between “knowing 
something” and “knowing some thing.” The latter refers to explicit knowledge of the 
grammatical structure of exemplars, the former is an intuitive sense of the 
grammaticality.  When structural knowledge is found to be largely unconscious, as was 
the case in this study, judgment knowledge can be either unconscious or conscious in 
nature (Dienes & Berry, 1997).  Conscious judgment knowledge establishes the 
phenomenological experience of an intuitive sense of the grammatical correctness of an 
exemplar, much the same way that we understand the correctness of an English sentence.  
We do not need to describe all the rules of grammar that make a sentence seem 
grammatical.  Unconscious judgment knowledge establishes the phenomenological 
experience of guessing.  In regards to guessing criterion, correct responses offered while 
guessing elevates the guessing criterion scores, which indicates unconscious knowledge.  
Yet, this measure does not evidence a lack of metaknowledge, it simply distinguishes the 
presence of tacit knowledge.  The zero-correlation criterion measures the difference 
between confidence scores when correct and incorrect.  Higher confidence when correct 
and lower confidence when incorrect indicates the presence of some metaknowledge.  
However, this measure alone does not tell us if the knowledge is due to an understanding 
of the structure of the grammar or is better understood as an intuitive sense of the 
underlying grammatical structure.  The performance of the yoked participants in this 
study provides the final piece of evidence to make this distinction.  Yoked performance 
was generally very low across all conditions, which indicates that the conscious 
knowledge suggested by the zero-correlation and PDP inclusion test is best characterized 
as conscious judgment knowledge.  
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Intellectual Merit and Broader Impacts 
A number of long-standing and intensely contested debates have persisted in the 
field of IL.  Debates revolve around the nature of the knowledge acquired in tasks 
traditionally found to involve IL.  Lending no small part in the debate has been the 
reintroduction of the cognitive unconscious to scientific inquiry.  Since that time, the 
study of the cognitive unconscious has met many challenges from academic 
psychologists, some going so far as to suggest that the concept of a cognitive unconscious 
has no place in psychology (e.g., St. John & Shanks, 1997; Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
Much of the difficulty involved in pursuing a scientific approach to the cognitive 
unconscious is based on attempts to establish appropriate experimental methods to 
highlight unconscious processes.  Moreover, much of the contention and debate regarding 
the scientific study of the cognitive unconscious rests on whether unconscious processes 
are indeed qualitatively distinct entities that produce (or contribute to) distinct behavioral 
characteristics.   
One of the more relevant contributions of the current research was its effort to 
determine the validity of indirect measures of the cognitive unconscious.  As Dienes 
(2008) has pointed out, the proof of the usefulness of the guessing and zero correlation 
criteria is in their heuristic value, which “has scarcely been tested” (p. 54). The combined 
effect of employing subjective measures, the PDP, yoked and transfer conditions, and the 
instructional and BCS manipulations proved to be a productive approach to addressing 
both the representational form and consciousness issues central to the IL debate. 
This research advances the field of IL and the cognitive unconscious in a number 
of ways.  It provided evidence of the time-course of learning in AGL, which researchers 
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in the field say are badly needed.  It also provided a variety of measures of the 
development of mental representations over training.  The approach of including multiple 
measures of conscious and unconscious knowledge provided the opportunity to determine 
if such measures were in mutual agreement with theoretical expectations.  
A practical broader application of the current research is how best to design 
teaching and training methods.  For example, it has been suggested that a period of 
passive reflection on material before more intensive learning may lead to better 
comprehension of material (Reber, 1993).  The logic follows that passive interactions 
with to-be-learned material creates a type of tacit framework that can better receive and 
make sense of new information.  Performance improvements in the incidental learning 
conditions provided some support for this application.  That is, the familiarization process 
provided for the “passive acquisition” of the structure of the AG, which then provided for 
the detection of patterns and co-variations in exemplars that seem to fit the structure.  In 
general, our understanding of how the cognitive unconscious operates will aid in creating 
more effective and efficient learning environments, whether it is the physical aspects of 
an actual classroom or a computer environment.  Another practical benefit of research in 
the field of IL and the cognitive unconscious is its application to the design of devices to 
make them more “user-friendly.”  Technological advancements, in some cases, seem to 
have outpaced what minds can work with at a functional level.  Advances in our 
understanding of human learning (and memory) will aid in the development of products 
that enable rather than frustrate human capacities.  This final consideration will no doubt 
prove very useful in a world where human interaction with technology increases with 
each passing year. 
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